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THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT FOR FOREIGN
PRIVATE EQUITY FIRMS IN CHINA
Lawrence Zhan Zhang*

ABSTRACT
From a little-known, foreign concept to a critical component of the
country’s increasingly multi-layered capital markets, private equity
in China has undergone tremendous development in the past decade.
This Note first reviews the representative deals of major U.S. private
equity firms (Bain Capital, Blackstone, Carlyle, KKR, TPG,
Warburg Pincus, and the private equity arms of Goldman Sachs and
Morgan Stanley) in China, and profiles leading Chinese private
equity firms and their relationship with the U.S. firms. Then, the
Note analyzes the evolving web of laws that regulates China’s
private equity industry, with special attention to the rise of RMB
funds, and recent legal developments such as the Foreign-Invested
Partnership (“FIP”) regulation and the Qualified Foreign Limited
Partners (“QFLP”) program that many believe will lead to a level
playing field for foreign and domestic firms. The thesis of this study
is two-fold. First, the development of a legal framework for private
equity in China is closely tied to the country’s economic
fundamentals. To date, private equity boomed in China largely in
response to the unmet financial needs of small and medium-sized
private companies and a financial system overly reliant on stateowned banks; going forward, the prosperity of foreign private equity
firms in China will hinge on the country’s gradual relaxation of its
foreign exchange control and its plans for the renminbi to become a
global currency. Second, private equity offers a unique lens for
*
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understanding China’s legal system. In particular, this study
examines the advantages and potential pitfalls of China’s
administrative rulemaking process, and the important yet
controversial role of the government in a historic economic
transformation.
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INTRODUCTION
2010 was a banner year for China’s private equity industry. A mere
decade ago, private equity was little known in China, and fund-raising
was trivial. The industry saw meteoric growth through the decade, first
led by American and other foreign private equity firms, with domestic
firms entering the scene in late 2006 and rapidly catching up. From
2003 to 2010, the compound annual growth of China’s private equity
industry was 40%.1 2010 saw eighty-two new China-focused private
equity funds that raised a total of $27.6 billion, and 363 new investments
in the total amount of $10.3 billion.2 In a series of new regulations and
decisions, Chinese government at the national, provincial and municipal
levels sent strong signals encouraging the country’s private equity
industry.
American private equity firms are pioneers and industry leaders in
the world. Major American private equity firms, such as Bain Capital,
Blackstone, Carlyle, KKR, TPG and Warburg Pincus set foot in China at
the dawn of this century, when China was just entering the World Trade
Organization, and when the Chinese regulatory regime was still largely
underdeveloped. These players brought fresh and bold ideas into the
fledging and tightly controlled capital markets in China.3 Along with
other types of financial institutions, such as investment banks, they
spurred an array of broad-based legislation and rulemaking processes. A
mere ten years later, these private equity firms find themselves in an

1. Lefei Liu, President, Beijing Private Equity Association (“BPEA”), Keynote
Address at the 2010 Global Private Equity Beijing Forum: Bentu Jijin Jiang Zhudao
Zhongguo PE Shichang [Domestic Funds Will Lead China’s Private Equity Market]
(Nov. 14, 2010), http://www.pedaily.cn/Item/200447.aspx.
2. ZERO2IPO RESEARCH CENTER, 2010 STATISTICS FOR THE VENTURE CAPITAL
AND PRIVATE EQUITY MARKETS IN CHINA 13, 16 (2010).
3. See, e.g., Frederik Balfour & Xiang Ji, Private Equity in China Comes of Age,
BUS. WK., July 24, 2007, available at http://www.businessweek.com/
globalbiz/content/jul2007/gb20070724_300288.htm; Shaun Rein, China’s Private
Equity Boom, BUS. WK., July 16, 2008, available at http://www.businessweek.com/
globalbiz/content/jul2008/gb20080716_744989.htm; Ellen Sheng, The Go-Go World of
Private Equity in China, WALL ST. J. DEAL J. (Aug. 30, 2010, 2:07 PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2010/08/30/the-go-go-world-of-private-equity-in-china/;
Private Equity in China: Barbarians in Love, ECONOMIST, Nov. 27, 2010, at 35.
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increasingly intricate web of laws and regulations.4
American firms’ overseas expansion tracks the recent private equity
boom at home, roughly from 2002 to 2007.5 During this period, the
amounts invested in private equity increased substantially. However, in
mid-2007, the credit crisis that started earlier in the mortgage markets
spilled over to the junk bond and leveraged loan markets, and as a result,
the entire leveraged finance market came to an abrupt halt.6 As the
markets at home recover gradually, major U.S. private equity funds have
been proactively seeking to expand their foothold in China through everlarger deals.7
Take a recent successful exit by TPG, a leading U.S. private equity
firm, as an example. In June 2009, TPG sold its entire 17% stake in the
Shenzhen Development Bank to Ping An Insurance8 for about $2.28
billion, following a $150 million investment in the bank in 2004. The
deal was recognized by the Dow Jones Private Equity Analyst as one of
the “Top 5 Buyout-Backed Exits Via M&A” in 2009,9 and is noteworthy
in several ways. First, the 2004 TPG-Newbridge10 investment in the
Shenzhen Development Bank, after a two-year negotiation process,
marked the first and only time that a Chinese national bank11 became
4.
5.

See infra Parts IV, V, and VI.
See Ronald W. Masulis & Randall S. Thomas, Does Private Equity Create
Wealth? The Effects of Private Equity and Derivatives on Corporate Governance, 76
U. CHI. L. REV. 219, 225 (2009).
6. DAVID P. STOWELL, AN INTRODUCTION TO INVESTMENT BANKS, HEDGE FUNDS,
AND PRIVATE EQUITY 291-92 (Academic Press 2010).
7. See Private Equity in China: Barbarians in Love, supra note 3, at 1.
8. Founded in 1988 and headquartered in Shenzhen, China. The Chairman of
Ping An Insurance is Ma Mingzhe, a one-time chauffeur, self-made man and an avid
advocate for diversified financial conglomerates in China. Ping An is currently China’s
second largest insurer, after China Life Insurance Co. See Rick Carew, TPG Nears Sale
of Stake in China Bank, WALL ST. J., June 9, 2009, at C2.
9. DOW JONES PRIVATE EQUITY ANALYST, 2009 REVIEW & 2010 OUTLOOK 30
(2010). The deal was the only one from “emerging markets” listed among the twenty
“Deals of the Year.”
10. Newbridge was TPG’s Asia investment arm at the time. See Carew, supra note
8, at C2.
11. Shenzhen Development Bank is one of the seventeen “joint-stock” Chinese
banks that operate on national license, aside from the “big four” state-owned banks. As
of the writing of this note, TPG remains the only foreign buyout firm to have gained
approval from China’s government to invest in a Chinese bank. In 2007, the China
Banking Regulatory Commission (“CBRC”) rejected Carlyle’s bid to buy part of
Chongqing City Commercial Bank. See Zijing Wu & Fox Hu, TPG’s Newbridge
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controlled by a foreign financial institution.12 Second, the chief
negotiator for TPG went on in December 2006 to create Bohai Fund,13
the first Chinese private equity fund denominated in renminbi
(“RMB”).14 Third, the acquirer, Ping An Insurance, is itself a
beneficiary of foreign investments, notably by Goldman Sachs and
Morgan Stanley in 1994, and by HSBC in 2002.15 Fourth, despite
spectacular return on this investment, TPG has reportedly had
difficulties navigating the regulatory framework in China.16
An American private equity professional in the China market
should not be surprised by these characteristics. Despite seemingly
abundant opportunities to make money, the market is now seeing more
and more highly competitive local firms, often spearheaded by people
formerly trained in American institutions. More importantly, laws and
regulations are developing very rapidly. This Note addresses these
concerns by outlining the legal environment for foreign private equity
funds in China, analyzing specific topics of interest, and discussing
Raises $1.2 Billion in Ping An Stock Offering, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 3, 2010, 5:14 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-09-02/tpg-s-newbridge-seeking-1-16-billion-insale-of-ping-an-insurance-shares.html. The investment by a foreign financial institution
in a Chinese bank is governed by the Jingwai Jinrong Jigou Touzi Rugu Zhongzi
Jinrong Jigou Guanli Banfa [Administrative Measures of the Investment and
Shareholding in Chinese-funded Financial Institutions by Foreign Financial Institutions]
(promulgated by the China Banking Reg. Comm’n, Dec. 8, 2003, effective Dec. 31,
2003).
12. TPG assuaged China’s banking regulators with an agreement for a five-year
lockup on the stake. TPG furthered its control by appointing a former U.S. Treasury
deputy secretary and CFO for Bank of America, Frank Newman, as chairman of the
bank and has worked since the 2004 purchase to stack the bank’s board with allies. See
Brian Bremner, The Great Bank Overhaul, BUS. WK., Aug. 22, 2005, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_34/b3948466.htm.
13. Luo Yan, Ou Wei Shi Shei [Who Is Ou Wei], HUANQIU QIYEJIA [GLOBAL
ENTREPRENEUR], Dec. 20, 2007, available at www.gemag.com.cn/gemag/new/
Picnew_content.asp?C_id=823. See also infra note 71 for a recent “exodus” of Chinese
talents from Western to China-based private equity firms.
14. Renminbi (literally “people’s currency”) is the official currency in the People’s
Republic of China (“PRC”). The primary unit of renminbi is yuan.
15. Press Release, Ping An, HSBC to Increase Stake in Ping An by Acquisition of
Shares from Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley (Apr. 9, 2005),
http://www.pingan.com/about/en/news_70052.jsp.
16. See Daniel Inman, Ping An to Invest in Shenzhen Development Bank, BUS.
WK., June 14, 2009, available at http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/
content/jun2009/gb20090614_511195.htm.
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potential legal developments and policy directions.
Part I paints the legal and business landscapes of private equity in
the United States. Part II reviews representative investments of major
U.S. private equity firms in China. Part III profiles leading Chinese
private equity firms and their relationship with their U.S. counterparts.
Part IV gives a general introduction to Chinese law, and analyzes the
evolving web of laws of which a foreign private equity firm in China
should be cognizant. Part V examines the Foreign-Invested Partnership
(“FIP”) regulation that came into effect in early 2010, and the race to set
up RMB funds among foreign private equity funds. Part VI discusses
the latest legal developments, including the Qualified Foreign Limited
Partners (“QFLP”) scheme and the Shanghai pilot program. The last
part is the Conclusion.

I. BARBARIANS AT THE GATE: PRIVATE EQUITY IN THE UNITED STATES
The contours of private equity can be a little amorphous.17 Some
commentators view private equity as an asset class consisting of pools of
actively managed capital organized to invest in privately held and
certain public companies and securities.18 Others have defined it based
on different forms of investment strategies: leveraged buyout, growth
capital, mezzanine capital, and venture capital.19 This well accepted
categorization, however, should be viewed with two caveats: first, for
historical reasons (for instance, KKR’s landmark buyout of RJR Nabisco
in the late 1980s),20 many people still see buyout funds as synonymous
with private equity; second, venture capital is often treated as distinct
from private equity because of its particular focus on early-stage, highpotential startup companies.

17. See Lloyd L. Drury, III, Private Equity and The Heightened Fiduciary Duty of
Disclosure, 6 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 33, 39 (2009).
18. MERRILL LYNCH ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS, PRIVATE EQUITY PRIMER 8
(2010).
19. STOWELL, supra note 6, at 283.
20. See generally GEORGE P. BAKER & GEORGE DAVID SMITH, THE NEW
FINANCIAL CAPITALISTS: KKR AND THE CREATION OF CORPORATE VALUE (Cambridge
Univ. Press 1998); BRYAN BURROUGH & JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE:
THE FALL OF RJR NABISCO (Harper & Row 1990).
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Figure 1
The Private Equity Spectrum

Source: MERRILL LYNCH ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS, PRIVATE EQUITY
PRIMER 8 (2010).

Private equity funds are typically structured as pass-through
entities, i.e. limited partnerships and limited liability companies that are
transparent for tax purposes. Private equity funds typically raise money
through private placements made pursuant to Regulation D (“Reg D,”
for accredited investors) or Regulation S (“Reg S,” for non-U.S.
investors) of the Securities Act of 1933 (“1933 Act”). The 1933 Act
requires that every offer and sale of securities be registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) through the filing of a
Registration Statement, including a disclosure document, known as a
Prospectus, unless some exemption from registration is available under
applicable law.21 Reg D provides three exemptions: Rules 504 and 505
were promulgated on the basis of Section 3(b) of the 1933 Act, which
authorizes the SEC to develop exemptions for offerings up to $5 million
in amount when registration is not necessary to protect the public
interest or investors; Rule 506, on the other hand, represents a
nonexclusive safe harbor for the private offering exemption of Section
4(2).22 Reg S provides safe harbors for off-shore distributions and resale
of unregistered securities of U.S. and foreign issuers, when (1) offers are
not made to persons in the United States; (2) the buyer is outside the
United States or the seller reasonably believes him to be; (3) no direct
selling effort is made in the United States; (4) the buyer is advised that
interests may not be offered or sold in the United States or to U.S.

21.
22.

Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2006).
JAMES D. COX, ROBERT W. HILLMAN & DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES
REGULATION 281 (Wolter Kluwer 6th ed. 2009).
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persons without registration or exemption.23
Private equity funds are structured as capital-commitment funds,
which are also known as drawdown funds. In other words, capital is
committed up front and then called down over a period of years (usually
one to eight) to fund investments, fees, expenses, etc. This stands in
contrast with hedge funds, which are structured as “mark to market”
vehicles that provide investors with redemption rights pursuant to
periodic (daily, monthly, quarterly) net asset values for the fund. Private
equity funds are illiquid: there is no right to redeem, and only a limited
market for transferring interests. Investors receive cash flow from
investments in the private equity funds by way of the distribution
waterfall. However, the line between hedge funds and private equity
funds has become blurrier, as many hedge funds are now creating hybrid
funds with illiquid side pockets in addition to liquid classes.
The Investment Company Act of 1940 provides two exemptions to
the registration requirement under the 1933 Act, namely Sections 3(c)(1)
and 3(c)(7), which form the basis of the hedge fund industry.24 Section
3(c)(1) exempts companies with fewer than 100 shareholders. Section
3(c)(7) exempts a company that is not making or proposing to make a
public offering of its securities, and whose shareholders are “qualified
purchasers” with a high net worth, which generally means individuals
who own specified investments worth at least $5 million, or institutions
that invest at least $25 million.25 In the past, one of the more commonly
used exemptions under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 is the
“private adviser exemption,” which is available to investment advisers
with fewer than fifteen clients, among other criteria.26 The Dodd-Frank
Act27 eliminates the private adviser exemption, which will have the

23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at 217-19.
COX, HILLMAN & LANGEVOORT, supra note 22, at 1116.
Id.
The private adviser exemption contained in Section 203(b)(3) of the Advisers
Act exempts from registration an investment adviser that (i) had fewer than fifteen
clients during the preceding twelve months; (ii) does not hold itself out to the public as
an investment adviser, and (iii) does not serve as an investment adviser to a registered
investment company or a business development company. See SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE,
MEAGHER & FLOM LLP & AFFILIATES, THE DODD-FRANK ACT: COMMENTARY AND
INSIGHTS 37 (2010); HAL S. SCOTT, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 799 (Foundation Press
17th ed. 2010).
27. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
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effect of requiring a large number of currently unregistered advisers to
register with the SEC.28 Meanwhile, the Dodd-Frank Act directs the
SEC to exempt from registration any investment adviser who advises
only private funds with less than $150 million in assets under
management in the United States.29

II. FAR EAST OR WILD WEST: U.S. PRIVATE EQUITY FIRMS IN CHINA
It is impossible to explain private equity-related legal issues in
China without first painting a picture of the very lively business
landscape. This part first presents a short biography of each of the
leading American private equity firms in China: Bain Capital,
Blackstone, Carlyle, KKR, TPG, Warburg Pincus, as well as the private
equity arms of Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, and then
summarizes some distinctive characteristics of their investment
activities, laying the groundwork for discussion of legal and regulatory
issues in later parts of the Note.
BAIN CAPITAL
Bain’s offices in Hong Kong and Shanghai are led by industry
pioneers such as Jonathan Zhu30 and Jingsheng Huang.31 Bain’s
28.
29.

Id. § 403; see also SKADDEN, supra note 26, at 37.
Dodd-Frank Act § 408; see also SEC Proposes Rules for the Registration of
Hedge Funds and Other Private Fund Advisers, PRIVATE EQUITY ALERT (Weil Gotshal,
New York, NY), Nov. 30, 2010, at 2-3.
30. Jonathan Zhu is a native of China and served as CEO of Morgan Stanley China
before joining Bain Capital in 2006.
See Jonathan Zhu, BAIN CAPITAL,
http://www.baincapital.com/team/TeamMember.aspx?id=102&viewType=ManagingDi
rectors (last visited Apr. 1, 2011). Calling himself an “accidental banker,” he famously
decided to go to law school while studying the poetry of Williams Wordsworth in a
Ph.D. program at Cornell in the late 1980s. See Michael Schuman, And for This He
Read Poetry?, TIME, Mar. 21, 2005, available at http://www.time.com/
time/magazine/article/0,9171,1039694,00.html.
31. Jingsheng Huang received an M.B.A. from Harvard Business School and an
M.A. from Stanford, and was a managing director of Softbank Asia Infrastructure Fund,
or SAIF, before joining Bain Capital in 2005. Huang previously led SAIF’s
investments in UTStarcom (Nasdaq: UTSI) and Shanda Interactive Entertainment, Ltd.
(Nasdaq: SNDA). Huang is an Independent Director of Shanda. See Jingsheng Huang,
BAIN
CAPITAL,
http://www.baincapital.com/team/TeamMember.aspx?id=

848

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XVI

representative deal in China was a $418 million purchase of a 12.8%
stake in GOME, China’s leading electronic appliance manufacturer.32
Bain competed against KKR and Warburg Pincus to win the deal,33 and
nominated three nonexecutive directors, including Jonathan Zhu, to
GOME’s board.
Bain also invested in a series of less high-profile companies,
including ASIMCO, Casda Biomaterials, GA PACK, Ideal Standard,
JinSheng International, Sinomedia Holding Limited, SUNAC, and
Suzhou HiPro Polymers.34
BLACKSTONE
Blackstone Greater China maintains offices in Hong Kong, Beijing,
and Shanghai, led by Antony Leung, former Financial Secretary of Hong
Kong SAR.35 In May 2007, China Investment Corporation (“CIC”),
China’s then-fledgling sovereign wealth fund, bought a $3 billion stake
in Blackstone, which subsequently raised $4.13 billion in its IPO in New
York in June, the largest stock market listing in the United States since
2002. However, the investment proved to be a very poor one and came
83&viewType=ManagingDirectors (last visited Apr. 1, 2011).
32. GOME was founded in 1987 by Huang Guangyu (1969- ), a native of South
China’s Guangdong Province. Huang was arrested by Chinese police in November
2008 for alleged economic crimes. Once China’ richest man (worth $6.3 billion in
2008), Huang was sentenced to fourteen years in prison and fined 800 million RMB in
May 2010 by the Beijing Second Intermediate People’s Court. Huang appealed, but the
verdict was affirmed by the Beijing High People’s Court in August 2010. The years of
wrangling over control of GOME between imprisoned founder Huang Guangyu and his
successor Chen Xiao ended with Chen’s “honorable departure” on March 9, 2011. See
Joe McDonald, Huang Guangyu, Former Richest Man in China, Gets 14 Years in Jail,
HUFFINGTON POST (May 18, 2010, 5:32 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2010/05/18/huang-guangyu-former-rich_n_579810.html#.
33. Jackie Cheung & Rick Carew, Bain Capital, China’s GOME Forge Deal,
WALL ST. J., June 23, 2009, at B4.
34. Investments, BAIN CAPITAL ASIA, http://www.baincapitalasia.com/Investments
(last visited Apr. 1, 2011).
35. See Antony Leung, BLACKSTONE, http://www.blackstone.com/cps/rde/xchg/
bxcom/hs/firm_ourpeople_antony_leung.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2011). Aside from
Leung’s official role, his marriage in July 2002 to Fu Mingxia, four-time Olympics
champion (“Queen of Diving”) and twenty-six years his junior, is a perennial talk of the
town. For some background on Antony Leung’s relationship with the PRC
government, see Mark Landler, A New Aide Prompts Talk of Beijing’s Strength in Hong
Kong, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2001, at A9.
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under intense criticism domestically.36
Blackstone tested the waters in September 2007 by acquiring a 20%
stake in China National BlueStar, a special chemical maker, from China
National Chemical Corporation for $600 million. The transaction was
approved by the National Development and Reform Commission
(“NDRC”) about four months later.37
More recently, in March 2010 Blackstone partnered with a
consortium to invest $600 million in Dili Group, which owns
Shouguang Agricultural Product Logistic Park, an agricultural-product
trading center.38
CARLYLE
Among American private equity firms, Carlyle is one of the early
movers, boasting “ten years of success in China.”39 The confidence is
well founded; judging from the numbers, Carlyle is indeed the most
active American private equity firm in China, investing $2.5 billion in

36. Keith Bradsher, China Faces Backlash at Home over Blackstone Investment,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2007, at C1.
37. See China Approves Blackstone Investment in BlueStar, REUTERS (Jan. 10,
2008, 6:43 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/01/10/us-blackstone-bluestaridUSPEK28690120080110. NDRC is a macroeconomic management agency under
China’s State Council, which has broad administrative and planning control over the
Chinese economy. Shan Fu, Senior Managing Partner in Blackstone’s Beijing office, is
a former official of the NDRC.
See Shan Fu, BLACKSTONE,
http://www.blackstone.com/cps/rde/xchg/bxcom/hs/firm_ourpeople_shan_fu.htm (last
visited Apr. 1, 2011).
38. Shouguang, home to about one million people in the coastal province of
Shandong, is known as China’s “home of vegetables” for its year-round harvests. See
Kennix Chim & George Chen, Blackstone in $600 Million China Agricultural Deal,
REUTERS (Mar. 17, 2010, 9:20 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/03/17/usblackstone-china-agricultural-idUSTRE62G24K20100317.
39. CARLYLE GROUP, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 10 (2008). Leaders in Carlyle’s China
offices include Wayne Tsou and Xiang-Dong Yang, among others. Tsou earned his
J.D. from Harvard Law School, an M.B.A. from Harvard Business School and an M.S.
in electrical engineering from California Institute of Technology, and worked for
Warburg Pincus from 1998 to 2004.
See Wayne Tsou, CARLYLE GROUP,
http://www.carlyle.com/Team/item5869.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2011). Yang received
his B.A. in economics from Harvard University and M.B.A. from Harvard Business
School. See Xiang-Dong Yang, CARLYLE GROUP, http://www.carlyle.com/team/
item5713.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2011).
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about fifty deals.40 In April 2010, Carlyle completed raising $2.55
billion for its third Asia fund, the Carlyle Asia Partners III (CAP III).
Carlyle earned its glory the hard way.41 Carlyle’s attempted and
eventually failed bid for Xugong Group, one of China’s largest
construction machinery manufacturers, was called by the Wall Street
Journal “a deal that helped define the limitations of what foreign private
equity investors could do in China.”42 Carlyle signed an ambitious deal
to purchase an 85% stake in Xugong in October 2005.43 On June 6,
2006, Xiang Wenbo, a senior executive44 from one of Carlyle’s bidding
competitors, started a blog to disclose alleged “scandals” in the bidding
process. Xiang rose to prominence by evoking nationalistic sentiments45
and concerns over the country’s national economic security when a large
chunk of state-owned assets would suddenly change hands to foreign
investors at a perceived low price. Two months later, a new and more
40. CARLYLE GROUP, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT 20 (2009). Carlyle founder David
Rubenstein reasserted his confidence in the firm’s investments in Asia during an
interview with Alan Murray, Executive Editor of the Wall Street Journal Online. See
Executive Breakfast Series: David M. Rubenstein, WALL ST. J. VIEWPOINTS (Mar. 18,
2010), http://online.wsj.com/ad/article/viewpoints-rubenstein.html.
41. In addition to the Xugong case, Carlyle also suffered setbacks in its attempts to
invest in Guangdong Development Bank and Chongqing City Commercial Bank,
among others. See Pan Hongxiu, Kailei Zixing, Jianghu Yeyu Shinian Deng
[Reflections of Carlyle: Ten Years in the Game], ZHONGGUO QIYEJIA [CHINA
ENTREPRENEUR], Apr. 2010, available at http://www.21cbh.com/HTML/2010-42/zNMDAwMDE3MTQzNw.html.
42. Dinny McMahon, Carlyle Moves On from Xugong Shadow, WALL ST. J. CHINA
REAL TIME REPORT (Jan. 12, 2010, 3:56 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/
2010/01/12/carlyle-moves-on-from-xugong-shadow/.
43. Rick Carew, Will China Buy the World? The Beijing Debate, WALL ST. J.
CHINA REAL TIME REPORT (Mar. 10, 2009, 5:33 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/
chinarealtime/2009/03/10/will-china-buy-the-world-the-beijing-debate/.
44. Xiang was Vice Chairman (now President) of Sany Group, founded in 1989
and based in Changsha, Hunan Province in Central China. The company is currently
undergoing rapid global expansion and has business relationships with approximately
fifty countries. During a visit in December 2010 by Yang Jiechi, China’s Foreign
Minister, Xiang Wenbo presented the Foreign Minister with a model of the Sany
Crawler Crane SCC4000 that was adopted by the Chilean government for the rescue of
the thirty-three trapped miners. Press Release, Sany Group, Sany Welcomes Visit by
Foreign Minister (Jan. 20, 2011), http://www.sanygroup.com/group/en-us/media/
24527_for_news_text.htm.
45. Carew, supra note 43; Echo Zhou, The Creator of “Created in China,” THE
LINK (China Europe International Business School, or CEIBS, Shanghai, China), Apr.
2009, available at http://www.ceibs.edu/link/latest/38900.shtml.
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restrictive foreign M&A regulation was jointly promulgated by six
government agencies.46 Carlyle reduced its proposed stake to 45% in
March 2007, and eventually gave up the proposal in July 2008.47 The
Xugong case offers fertile ground for studying the administrative
rulemaking processes in China: namely, how they are affected by social
pressure in a country where there is no representative democracy in the
Western sense, and how they are shaped by the coordination and
conflicts of interest between different government agencies.
Carlyle enjoyed successes in many other transactions.
In
November 2000, Carlyle invested $8 million in Ctrip, a leading online
and offline hotel reservation and travel services provider in China.48 In
December 2003, Ctrip completed an IPO on Nasdaq (“CTRP”); and in
2004, Carlyle fully exited its investment in Ctrip.49
In December 2005, Carlyle signed an agreement with China Pacific
Insurance Group Co. (CPIC Group) to participate in the injection of
RMB 6.6 billion new capital into China Pacific Life Insurance Co.
(CPIC Life), the country’s third largest life insurer. The Carlyle
partnership held a 25% stake (RMB 3.3 billion, or $410 million50) in
CPIC Life after the injection.51 CPIC Life subsequently underwent two
IPOs, first in Shanghai in December 2007, and then in Hong Kong in

46.
47.

See Foreign M&A Provisions, infra note 173.
Pan, supra note 41. Also note that China passed its first Property Law to
formally protect private property during this period of time, when the ideological debate
between the old and the new was in high tide. See Wuquan Fa [Property Law]
(promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 16, 2007, effective Oct. 1, 2007);
Joseph Kahn, China Backs Property Law, Buoying Middle Class, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16,
2007, at A1.
48. See Liu Hongyan, Kailei Zhongguo de Touzi Chuanqi [The Investment Legend
of Carlyle China], 21 SHIJI JINGJI BAODAO [21 CENTURY BUSINESS HERALD], Jan. 14,
2006,
available
at
http://www.cye.com.cn/chuangyeketang/caifujinyan/
20060114175137.htm.
49. Id.
50. All currency conversions in this note are based on then-current exchange rate
between the dollar and the renminbi (yuan). The exchange rate was largely fixed at 1
dollar = 8.3 yuan from 1994 to July 21, 2005. From that day on, the yuan appreciated
gradually for about 20%. As of the revising of this note (August 23, 2011), the
exchange rate is 1 dollar = 6.3976 yuan.
51. Prudential Financial (United States) was a strategic investor in this transaction.
Press Release, Carlyle, China Pacific Insurance (Group) Co. Joins with Carlyle to Inject
a Total of RMB 6.6 Billion New Capital into China Pacific Life Insurance Co. (Dec. 19,
2005), http://www.carlyle.com/media%20room/news%20archive/2005/item6743.html.
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December 2009, raising a total of RMB 30 billion, or $4.1 billion. In
late 2010 and early 2011, Carlyle sold half of its stake in CPIC Life for
approximately $2.67 billion.52
In addition to CPIC Life, three other Chinese portfolio companies
of Carlyle – China Forestry, Concord Medical Services and Kaisa Group
– successfully completed public offerings in Hong Kong and New York
in 2009, raising a combined total of $3.8 billion.53
Figure 2
“Carlyle Group - Ten Years of Success in China.”

Source: CARLYLE GROUP, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 10 (2008)
52. Before the sellings occurred on December 30, 2010 and January 10, 2011,
Carlyle owned 61% of CPIC Life’s H shares (the shares of companies incorporated in
mainland China that are traded on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange). Chen Huiying,
Kailei Zuobie Zhongguo Taibao, 5 Nian Jingzhuan 50 Yi Meiyuan [Carlyle Bids
Farewell to CPIC Life, Netting $5 Billion in Five Years], XIN SHI JI [CENTURY
WEEKLY], Jan. 17, 2011, available at http://news.163.com/11/0118/04/
6QLDO5HD00014AED.html.
53. CARLYLE GROUP, supra note 40, at 6. For a full list of Carlyle’s portfolio
companies in Asia, see Asia Portfolio, CARLYLE, http://www.carlyle.com/Geography/
Asia/item8461.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2011).
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KOHLBERG KRAVIS ROBERTS (KKR)
KKR’s China endeavor is led by David Liu54 and backed by KKR
co-founder Henry Kravis.55 In September 2007, KKR led a consortium
that invested $450 million (of which KKR contributed $150 million)56 in
Tianrui Cement, a family enterprise and one of China’s top ten cement
producers. Later, KKR reportedly experienced serious trouble in terms
of corporate governance with Tianrui’s founder, Li Liufa.57
Then, in June 2009, KKR invested $150 million in Modern Dairy, a
leading dairy farming company headquartered in Ma Anshan in China’s
central province of Anhui.58 Modern Dairy is one of the largest
operators of centralized large-scale dairy farms in China, and with
KKR’s investment, Modern Dairy targeted to construct another twenty
to thirty large-scale farms in China as well as to pursue acquisitions.59
54. David Liu graduated from Columbia University as Class Salutatorian with a
B.S. in Electrical Engineering. See David Liu, KKR, http://www.kkr.com/team/
theteam.cfm?CategoryName=Investment%20Professionals-Private%20Equity%
20and%20Asset%20Management&TitleSortOrder=LastName%20Asc&Pagenum=3
(last visited Apr. 1, 2011).
55. Henry Kravis had personally met with Liu Deshu, President of SinoChem, the
parent company of Fast Eastern Leasing (now renamed Fast East Horizon) to discuss
KKR’s investment in the latter. Press Release, SinoChem, Liu Deshu Meets KKR
Global CEO (Sept. 21, 2010), http://www.sinochem.com/tabid/871/InfoID/11462/
frtid/790/Default.aspx. Kravis also spoke at the annual Global Private Equity Beijing
Forum
on
November
10,
2008
(Chinese
transcript
available
at
http://finance.sina.com.cn/hy/20081110/10555487233.shtml).
56. Press Release, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts, KKR Leads US$450 Million
Financing for Tianrui Cement (Sept. 17, 2007), http://www.kkr.com/
releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=333004&KeepThis=true&TB_iframe=true&height=461&
width=592 (“Tianrui Cement has also received commitments from the International
Finance Corporation and an international banking syndicate led by JPMorgan for an
additional US$335 million of USD and RMB long-term financing.”).
57. See Tina Wang, KKR’s Concrete Lessons In China, FORBES, July 9, 2009,
available
at
http://www.forbes.com/2009/07/09/kkr-tianrui-cement-china-privateequity-asia.html (“By April 2008, Li Liufa was seen as running Tianrui Cement like his
own fiefdom, say industry sources. A board meeting scheduled for that month in Henan
was not held because Li did not show up, and this upset the head of KKR’s China team,
David Haifeng Liu, according to the former executive.”).
58. Modern Dairy was founded in 2005 by former managers of Mengniu Dairy,
China’s largest liquid milk producer. See Cathy Chan, KKR Said to Pay $150 Million
for Stake in China’s Modern Dairy, BLOOMBERG (June 15, 2009, 6:00 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a1hRKK7enOLw.
59. Press Release, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts, Ma Anshan Modern Farming
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Modern Dairy had its Hong Kong IPO in late 2010.60
TPG
TPG61 has a long track record of investing in China. In addition to
the Shenzhen Development Bank transaction mentioned earlier, another
landmark deal was TPG’s investment (with General Atlantic, another
leading private equity firm) in Lenovo in 2005.62 The private equity
firms owned a combined 2.8% stake in Lenovo, began reducing their
holdings in 2007, and eventually exited in fall 2010.63
TPG’s investments in China64 also include Yunnan Red Winery
(March 2007, $14 million),65 China Grand Automotive Services (three

Receives Investment from KKR (June 15, 2009), http://www.kkr.com/
releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=389500&KeepThis=true&TB_iframe=true&height=461&
width=592. One reviewer of this note pointed out that “this is an extremely successful
investment that distinguishes premier foreign funds from the “eat what’s up to your
mouth” domestic funds. When they invested in this company, it was still making a big
loss and the cash flow was negative. A domestic private equity fund would hardly take
such deal. Obviously, KKR foresaw the bright future of scaled modern farming that
was beyond the tradition farming skill of China. And they have the global resources to
help the company to grow big.” E-mail from Hogan Chao, China First Capital, to
Lawrence Zhan Zhang, Fordham Law School (Mar. 27, 2011, 02:56 EST) (on file with
author).
60. See Fox Hu, China Modern Diary May Raise $571 Million in IPO, Terms
Show, BLOOMBERG, (Nov. 11, 2010, 4:54 AM), http://www.businessweek.com/
news/2010-11-11/china-modern-dairy-may-raise-571-million-in-ipo-terms-show.html.
61. TPG was founded as Texas Pacific Group in 1992, but later shortened its name
to TPG. See Henny Sender, “Sorry, Sir. Texas Pacific Group Isn’t Here Anymore,”
WALL ST. J. DEAL J. (Mar. 1, 2007, 11:39 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2007/03/01/
sorry-sir-texas-pacific-group-isnt-here-anymore/.
62. Press Release, Lenovo, Lenovo Announces US$350 Million Strategic
Investment from Leading Private Equity Firms (Mar. 31, 2005),
http://www.lenovo.com/news/us/en/2005/04/investors.html.
63. Philip Lagerkranser & Mark Lee, Lenovo Falls after TPG, General Atlantic
Said to Exit, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 16, 2010, 6:42 AM), http://www.businessweek.com/
news/2010-11-16/lenovo-falls-after-tpg-general-atlantic-said-to-exit.html.
64. Unlike other private equity firms discussed here, which all disclose their
portfolio companies, on its website, TPG provides no information other than the contact
information for its fourteen global offices, adding to the difficulty of research.
65. TPG Fund Makes First China Investment: Yunnan Wine, REUTERS (Apr. 11,
2007,
3:25
AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/04/11/tpg-chinaidUSHKG31694620070411. Yunnan is a province in Southwest China.
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investments from 2007 to 2010, for undisclosed amounts),66 shoe retailer
Daphne (May 2009, $80.5 million),67 supermarket chain WuMart
(August 2009, $120 million),68 and casual sportswear manufacturer
China Vogue (October 2010, $45 million),69 among others.
TPG hired Mary Ma, former Chief Financial Officer of Lenovo, to
head its China operations in September 2007.70 Ma left TPG in early
2011 to start another fund, joining other mainland executives at Western
buyout firms who have decided to strike out on their own.71
WARBURG PINCUS
Warburg Pincus currently has twenty-one portfolio companies in
China,72 covering a diverse range of business sectors. Notable
66. Bei Hu, TPG-Owned China Grand Auto Said to Plan $1 Billion Initial Public
Offering, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 15, 2010, 6:03 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2010-04-15/tpg-owned-china-grand-auto-said-to-plan-1-billion-initial-publicoffering.html.
67. TPG Invests In Chinese Shoe Retailer Daphne, REUTERS (May 25, 2009, 11:50
PM), http://www.forbes.com/feeds/afx/2009/05/25/afx6462540.html.
68. WuMart Sells Stake to TPG, Hony ahead of Possible Listing, CHINA ECONOMIC
REVIEW, Aug. 14, 2009, available at http://www.chinaeconomicreview.com/
dailybriefing/2009_08_14/Wumart_sells_stake_to_TPG_Hony_ahead_of_possible_listi
ng.html.
69. TPG Invests $45M in China Sportswear Maker, CHINA DAILY, Oct. 19, 2010,
available
at
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2010-10/19/content_
11430382.htm.
70. Ma worked for Lenovo for 17 years before joining TPG. Mark Kleinman, TPG
Hires Mary Ma for China Push, TELEGRAPH, Sept. 7, 2007, available at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/markets/2815270/TPG-hires-Mary-Ma-for-Chinapush.html; Carlos Tejada, Business Savvy Propels Ma in China Market, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 13, 2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123187470105578101.html.
71. Henny Sender, TPG’s Ma Joins Exodus of Chinese Talents from Western Buyout Firms, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2011, available at http://www.ftchinese.com/story/
001036845/en. One reviewer of this note, an insider of the Chinese private equity
industry, commented that “I think cultural conflicts and deal execution are the main
issues. For instance, I heard that to invest in a hotpot chain, analysts at KKR need to
produces a 30-page presentation just to explain what is hotpot to people in New York.
Overnight conference call is regular but discussions are often trivial. Such low
efficiency makes it difficult for foreign funds to compete with local ones. Chinese
market is rapidly changing, you need to take quick action and lock in as much as
possible today.” E-mail from Hogan Chao, China First Capital, to Lawrence Zhan
Zhang, Fordham Law School (Mar. 27, 2011, 02:56 EST) (on file with author).
72. Portfolio
Companies
by
Geography,
WARBURG
PINCUS,
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investments include: a 2005 investment in Harbin Pharmaceuticals, a
leading domestic pharmaceutical company; a 2006 investment in 7 Day
Inn, founded in Guangzhou, Guangdong Province and one of the leading
budget hotel chains in China; and a 2006 investment in Greentown
China, headquartered in Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province and one of the
leading residential property developers focused on the country’s urban
middle class.
In addition to the six private equity firms discussed above, the
private equity arms of Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley have also
been quite active in China.
GOLDMAN SACHS PRIVATE EQUITY GROUP
Goldman Sachs bought a 4.9% stake in the Industrial and
Commercial Bank of China (“ICBC”) in April 2006 for $2.58 billion,
ahead of the bank’s Hong Kong IPO on October 10, 2006. In March
2009, Goldman Sachs committed to a new lockup in relation to its
investment in ICBC.73 In early June 2009, Goldman raised $1.9 billion
by selling almost the entire stake that it was free to divest (20%) under
the revised lockup agreement with ICBC.74 Then, in September 2010,
Goldman reduced its stake from 3.9% to 3.1% to raise $2.05 billion.75

http://www.warburgpincus.com/portfolio/PortfolioBySubRegion.aspx (last visited Apr.
1, 2011).
73. Under then existing lockup, the ICBC shares held by Goldman Sachs would
have become free in equal installments on April 28, 2009 and October 20, 2009. Under
the new lockup, Goldman Sachs would not sell 80% of its ICBC shares at any time
prior to April 28, 2010. Press Release, Goldman Sachs, ICBC and Goldman Sachs
Announce New Share Lock-up Commitment and Reaffirm Strategic Cooperation (Mar.
25, 2009), http://www2.goldmansachs.com/our-firm/press/pressreleases/archived/2009/
icbc-gs-commitment.html.
74. Bei Hu & Christine Harper, Goldman Sachs Raises $1.91 Billion in ICBC Stock
Sale, BLOOMBERG (June 2, 2009, 5:24 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a4HY3.3hvmNM&refer=home.
75. Nisha Gopalan & Peter Stein, Goldman Cutting Stake in China’s ICBC, WALL.
ST. J., Sept. 30, 2010, at C2.
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Figure 3
Offloading: Goldman Sachs’ buying and selling of ICBC

Source: Nisha Gopalan & Peter Stein, Goldman Cutting Stake in China’s
ICBC, WALL. ST. J., Sept. 29, 2010.

Aside from its activities in the banking sector, Goldman led a
consortium in June 2007 to acquire a majority stake in Shuanghui, a
leading meat processing company based in Henan Province, Central
China.76 Like Carlyle, Goldman Sachs has had its own share of bad luck
navigating China’s regulatory labyrinth. In November 2006, Goldman
proposed to buy a 10.71% stake for $96 million in Guangdong Midea,
an electronic appliance giant, in which both Bain and Warburg Pincus
have also invested. In August 2007, the deal was vetoed by the China
Securities Regulatory Commission on the sole ground that the “price
was too low,” even though the deal had been approved by the Ministry
of Commerce two months earlier.77

76. Goldman has gradually reduced its stake over the years, down to about 10% by
the end of 2009. Goldman Sachs HK Unit Ups China Shuanghui Stake 25% to 60.7%,
MARKETWATCH (June 17, 2007, 10:52 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/
goldman-sachs-hk-unit-ups-china-shuanghui-stake-25-to-607.
77. See Shu-Ching Jean Chen, Too Good a Deal for Goldman Sachs, FORBES, Aug.
30, 2007, available at http://www.forbes.com/2007/08/30/goldman-midea-chinamarkets-equity-cx_jc_markets2.html. In the time it took the deal to pass through the
regulators, Midea’s share price rose more than five times. The report indicates that
TPG-Newbridge owns 16.68% of Midea. Id.
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MORGAN STANLEY PRIVATE EQUITY ASIA (“MSPEA”)
MSPEA is one of the leading private equity investors in Asia,
having invested in the region for over fifteen years. Half of its twentyfour portfolio companies are in China, including such household names
in China as Belle International, Hengan International, Mengniu Diary,
Nanfu Battery, Paradise Retail, and Ping An Insurance (which acquired
the entire 17% stake in Shenzhen Development Bank from TPG).78
Some noteworthy characteristics emerge from the “biographies”
presented above. In the West, private equity firms often engage in
leveraged buyouts, but they could almost never do so in China.79 A
typical private equity investment in China is a non-controlling stake of
15-40% in an operating company, with the money intended as growth
capital.80 The percentage of shares that a foreign private equity fund can
acquire in Chinese companies is restricted by Chinese laws and
regulations.81 As we see from the foregoing discussion, investment
amounts range from $8 million (investment in Ctrip.com by Carlyle in
2000) to $600 million (investments in National BlueStar and Shouguang
Agriculture by Blackstone in 2007 and 2010, respectively), and even
higher amounts are bound to emerge now that these firms have come
onshore with their own RMB funds.
American private equity firms invest in a wide range of industries
and regions in China. The top ten industries as ranked by investments
are biotechnology/healthcare, cleaning technology, mechanical
engineering, food & drinks, Internet, retail, real estate, agriculture &
forestry, chemical engineering, and financial services.82 In terms of
regions, American firms no longer limit themselves to the relatively
affluent coastal areas, as foreign capital used to do in the early days;
rather, they have expanded into the vast inland and even western
frontiers of China.
Carlyle has closed by far the most deals, followed by Warburg
Pincus and Bain. TPG earned itself a big name through high-profile
78. Private Equity Portfolio, MORGAN STANLEY, http://www.morganstanley.com/
institutional/invest_management/private_equity/pe_asia/portfolio.html (last visited Apr.
1, 2011).
79. See Balfour & Ji, supra note 3.
80. See Private Equity in China: Barbarians in Love, supra note 3, at 35.
81. See, e.g., Foreign Strategic Investment Measures, infra note 171; Foreign M&A
Provisions, infra note 173.
82. ZERO2IPO RESEARCH CENTER, supra note 2, at 18.
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investments in Lenovo and Shenzhen Development Bank. Blackstone
and KKR each closed a small handful of mega-deals.83 Many of these
firms’ portfolio companies are small and medium-sized private
companies that are most in need of growth capital.

III. THE WORST OFFENDER OR A STRONG CONTENDER:
DOMESTIC PLAYERS84
Thanks to supportive national economic policy, the unprecedented
speed of global information flow, and their own aptitude, domestic
Chinese private equity firms have transformed themselves from
apprentices to equal players with spectacular swiftness.
China’s first domestic private equity company with an RMBdenominated fund, Bohai, was founded only on December 30, 2006,
with main shareholders such as BOC International, Tianjin Teda,
National Social Security Fund (“NSSF”), and China Development Bank
(“CDB”).85 Because it had no precedent, the company had to obtain
special approval from China’s State Council and the National
Development and Reform Commission.86 Even though the plan to found
Bohai was approved as early as December 2005, it took the parties a full
year to sort out the legal structure and relationships of this new entity.87
Bohai is undeniably a product of experimentation and compromise; it is
a “hybrid” of corporation and partnership, unlike its American
counterparts, which are predominantly limited partnerships.88
This Note also surveys some other major Chinese private equity
83. This statement does not take into account Blackstone’s RMB Fund, the
Zhonghua Development Fund (established in August 2009 with the government of
Shanghai Pudong New Area). See Zhonghua Development Fund, BLACKSTONE,
http://www.blackstone.com/cps/rde/xchg/bxcom/hs/businesses_aam_newinitiatives_zho
nghua.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2011).
84. See Yang Wang, Book Note, China Reexamined: The Worst Offender or a
Strong Contender?, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1143 (2008) (reviewing RANDALL
PEERENBOOM, CHINA MODERNIZES: THREAT TO THE WEST OR MODEL FOR THE REST?
(Oxford Univ. Press 2007)).
85. See Zhao Jianfei, Bohai Jijin: PE Zhongguo Zao [Bohai Fund: PE Made in
China], CAIJING [CAIJING], Jan. 6, 2007, available at http://magazine.caijing.com.cn/
2007-01-06/110066153.html.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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firms, including CDH, Citic private equity, Hony, Hopu, and New
Horizon. Headed by Dr. Shangzhi Wu89, CDH is a spin-off from China
International Capital Corporation (“CICC”)90 and was incorporated in
Cayman Islands in May 2002. CDH has raised capital for four funds,
enlisting investors such as Stanford Management Company (the
manager of Stanford University’s endowment), sovereign-wealth fund
Government of Singapore Investment Corporation, and International
Finance Corporation, a member of the World Bank Group.91 Thanks to
its inheritance from CICC, from 2002 to 2005 CDH partnered closely
with Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs in a series of investments, and
profited handsomely.92 Under the leadership of Lefei Liu93 and Dr.
89. Wu received his Ph.D. in mechanical engineering from MIT in 1991, and was a
senior investment officer at the International Finance Corporation from 1991 to 1993.
From 1995 to 2002, Wu worked for CICC, serving as the head of the direct investment
department beginning in 1996. Wu became a managing director in 1999 and served as
a member of CICC’s management committee between 2000 and 2002. See Shangzhi
Wu, FORBES, http://people.forbes.com/profile/shangzhi-wu/20595 (last visited Apr. 1,
2011).
90. CICC is China’s premier investment bank. Morgan Stanley and China
Construction Bank helped form CICC in 1995, but disputes with CICC’s management
over personnel, corporate culture, and CICC’s dealings with other foreign banks meant
that Morgan Stanley over time became a passive investor. After a three-year effort to
offload its interest in CICC, in December 2010, Morgan Stanley received long-awaited
approval from the Chinese government to sell its 34.3% stake in CICC, clearing the
way for the U.S. investment bank to pursue a new securities joint venture in China. Its
shares in CICC were sold to KKR, TPG, Government of Singapore Investment
Corporation, and Great Eastern Holdings Ltd., an insurer controlled by OverseaChinese Banking Corporation. See Kevin Kingsbury & Joy C. Shaw, Morgan Stanley’s
Sale of CICC Gets Approval, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 2010, at C2. CICC is run by Levin
Zhu, son of former Chinese premier Zhu Rongji. See Cathy Chan, China Weatherman
Zhu Loses Grip as Citic Weakens CICC’s Perch, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 25, 2008, 7:39
PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=arQz8cVWo7Xo&
refer=exclusive; David Barboza, Deal Seen for Stake in China Investment Bank, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 24, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/24/business/
global/24yuan.html.
91. See CDH Investments, ZERO2IPO, http://www.zero2ipo.com.hk/cvcf/article/
sponsors/29865.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2011).
92. Investments with Morgan Stanley included Mengniu Diary, Paradise Retail,
and Shanshui; investments with Goldman Sachs included Yurun Group, Focus Media,
and Shuanghui. See Li Ling, Dinghui Chuangtou cong “Bang Dakuan” dao “Dakuan”
[CDH: From Gold Digger to Gold], XIN CAIFU [NEW FORTUNE], Aug. 15, 2006,
available at http://www.p5w.net/newfortune/caiji/200608/t463976.htm.
93. See Lefei Liu, CITIC PRIVATE EQUITY, http://www.citicpe.com/liu_le_fei-
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Yibin Wu94, Citic private equity was established in June 2008 with the
approval of the NDRC. It is the strategic onshore private equity
investment platform of Citic Group and Citic Securities, which owns
71% of Citic private equity.95 Citic private equity currently manages an
RMB fund, Mianyang Scientific City Fund, which has a size of RMB 9
billion ($1.37 billion).96 Hony Capital was formerly the investment
branch of Lenovo Group. Managed by John Zhao,97 Hony has won
equity commitments from Goldman Sachs, Temasek Holdings, the
endowments of Stanford and Notre Dame universities, and has coinvested with TPG and Legend Holdings in WuMart in August 2009.98
Hopu Fund was established by Fang Fenglei,99 the former chairman of
eng.php (last visited Apr. 1, 2011). Liu was the Chief Investment Officer of China Life
Insurance Company before heading Citic private equity. He received a bachelor’s
degree in economics from Renmin University of China, and a masters’ degree from the
Chinese Academy of Social Science (“CASS”). His father is Liu Yunshan, a CPC
(Communist Party of China) Pulitburo member and director of the CPC Central
Publicity Department, who is seen as a strong contender for the Pulitburo Standing
Committee in 2012. See Cheng Li, China’s Midterm Jockeying: Gearing Up for 2012,
Part 1: Provincial Chiefs, CHINA LEADERSHIP MONITOR, Feb. 15, 2010, available at
http://www.hoover.org/publications/china-leadership-monitor/article/5330.
94. Wu has a Ph.D. from Harvard, and after heading up Asia-Pacific mergers and
acquisitions as partner at McKinsey & Company, he went on to lead Lenovo’s
acquisition of IBM’s PC division and oversee Legend Holdings, Lenovo’s investment
arm. See Yibing Wu, CITIC PRIVATE EQUITY, http://www.citicpe.com/wu_yi_bingeng.php (last visited Apr. 1, 2011).
95. See Duan Xiaoyan, Zhongxin Chanye Jijin: Zuida de Renminbi PE Shi Zenyang
Liancheng de [Citic Private Equity: How was the Largest Renminbi PE Forged], 21
SHIJI JINGJI BAODAO [21 CENTURY BUSINESS HERALD], Jan. 29, 2010, available at
http://www.21cbh.com/HTML/2010-2-1/164536.html. Citic Group was founded in
1979 by Rong Yiren (1916-2005) who was seen as the epitome of “red capitalist” in
China and who would later become China’s Vice President (1993-98). See David
Barboza, Rong Yiren, a Chinese Billionaire, Dies at 89, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2005, at
C14.
96. Jamil Anderlini, Local Buy-out Firms Defy U.S. Groups in China, FIN. TIMES,
Feb. 8, 2010, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/13b1d6b2-14da-11df-8f1d00144feab49a.html#axzz1KJkZTZ00.
97. Zhao holds an M.B.A. from Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern
University. See John Zhao, HONY CAPITAL, http://www.honycapital.com/hony_en/
manage/team.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2011).
98. See Hony Capital, CHINAVENTURE, http://i.data.chinaventure.com.cn/i/32/ (last
visited Apr. 1, 2011).
99. Fang is regarded as the man responsible for convincing his former boss and
mentor Wang Qishan (now China’s Vice Premier, in charge of the economy) to adopt
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Goldman Sachs’ securities partnership in China, and is advised by Clark
Randt, former United States Ambassador to China (2001-09) and former
head of Shearman & Sterling’s Asia practices.100 New Horizon has
created a $100 million fund in 2005, a $500 million fund in 2007, and a
third fund in 2010. Its investors include JPMorgan Chase, Deutsche
Bank and Temasek Holdings.101
For years, China’s National Social Security Fund has been the
largest limited partner in these domestic private equity funds, although
its prominence may be matched or even surpassed in the future, as China
relaxed the restrictions in mid-2010 for insurance funds to invest up to
5% of their asset in private equity.102 The domestic private equity firms’
often extremely strong political connections have generated both interest
and controversy. On the one hand, the rise of private equity in China is
an unmistakable response to the failure of state-owned banks in meeting
the financial needs of small and medium-sized companies in the private
sector, and support from the state certainly facilitates the acceptance of
private equity within China’s financial circles.103 On the other hand, a
number of authors have offered a more sobering assessment that these
political connections are a reflection of fundamental flaws in China’s
economic development model, despite its veneer of a market economy

the American investment banking model and establish CICC, a joint venture with
Morgan Stanley, in 1995. See Jamil Anderlini & Sundeep Tucker, The Rise of China’s
Ultimate
Dealmaker,
FIN.
TIMES,
May
13,
2009,
available
at
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/8efd3718-3fe6-11de-9ced-00144feabdc0.html#
axzz1KJkZTZ00; Cathy Chan, Goldman’s Fang Makes First Private Equity Investment,
BLOOMBERG
(Aug.
30,
2008,
1:06
AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/
apps/news?sid=aOF3lVH7WqRE&pid=newsarchive.
100. Rick Carew, Former Ambassador Randt Advises on Chinese Private Equity,
WALL ST. J. CHINA REAL TIME REPORT (Nov. 24, 2009, 7:02 AM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2009/11/24/former-ambassador-randt-advises-onchinese-private-equity/.
101. China’s New Horizon Capital Raises 1 Billion Yuan Fund, REUTERS (Jan. 13,
2009,
5:03
AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/01/13/newhorizon-fundidUSPEK11978920090113. One of the founders of New Horizon was Winston Wen,
son of the Chinese premier Wen Jiabao. According to an announcement made by New
Horizon on October 17, 2010, Winston Wen was no longer with the firm.
102. See infra Part VI.
103. See Rick Carew, China’s ‘Princelings’ and the PE, WALL ST. J. DEAL J. (Feb.
1, 2010, 12:22 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2010/02/01/chinas-princelings-and-thepe/.
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and breathtaking growth rate in the past decades.104

IV. SYSTEM IN THE MAKING: THE EVOLVING WEB OF LAWS
The legal system of the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) is in
form much closer to the legal system of continental Europe than to the
common law, but also contains substantial elements borrowed from the
former Soviet Union and inherited from traditional Chinese law.105 In
the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), China was in legal
shambles and had virtually no contemporary legislation, and had to start
from scratch.106
To understand China’s legal system, one must first understand
China’s political system. The PRC is in form a unitary, not a federalist
state, and all power flows from the central government in Beijing; that
is, local governments have only such power as the central government
chooses to delegate to them (although in reality, local governments
enjoy varying degrees of autonomy because of the limits of effective
supervision).107 The PRC rejects the notion of horizontal separation of
powers between the executive, legislative and judicial branches of
government. Constitutionally speaking, the National People’s Congress
(“NPC”), which is the legislature, sits at the apex of China’s political
power structure.108 The approximately three thousand delegates of the
NPC, who are elected for five-year terms, convene for merely ten days
104. See generally Rick Carew, Cadre Capitalism, WALL ST. J., July 12, 2010
(reviewing RICHARD MCGREGOR, THE PARTY: THE SECRET WORLD OF CHINA’S
COMMUNIST RULERS (Harper 2010)), available at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052748703580104575362120444628254.html; Rick Carew, Raising the
Red Flag on Red Capitalism, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 2011 (reviewing CARL E. WALTER &
FRASER J.T. HOWIE, RED CAPITALISM: THE FRAGILE FINANCIAL FOUNDATION OF
CHINA’S EXTRAORDINARY RISE (John Wiley & Sons 2011)), available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704030704576070981801479062.htm.
105. Donald C. Clarke, The Chinese Legal System, GEORGE WASHINGTON
UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW (July 4, 2005), http://docs.law.gwu.edu/facweb/dclarke/
public/ChineseLegalSystem.html.
106. Jerome A. Cohen, China’s Reform Era Legal Odyssey, FAR E. ECON. REV.,
Dec. 2008, at 34.
107. Peter Howard Corne, Creation and Application of Law in the PRC, 50 AM. J.
COMP. L. 369, 370 (2002).
108. In reality, that position is occupied by the CPC Pulitburo Standing Committee.
See Clarke, supra note 105.
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each year, while the NPC Standing Committee (which currently consists
of 175 members) and its nine specialized committees work full time.109
The day-to-day work of the government is carried out by the State
Council under the Premier.110 The State Council is divided into various
functional ministries and commissions. This bifurcation between the
people’s congress and the day-to-day government is then replicated at
the provincial and municipal levels.111
The judiciary is not independent and is institutionally weak.112 The
Chief Justice of the People’s Supreme Court113 is not a member of the
Politburo; by comparison, the head of the Ministry of Public Security is
a member.114 Many judges are either young or not well trained, although
the situation is rapidly changing as new breeds of well-trained law
graduates replenish the system.115
Before the Criminal Code was enacted in 1979, the Constitutional
Law passed in 1954 was the only statute of the People’s Republic of
China in force for twenty-five years.116 Massive legislation began only
in the 1980s, and the rule of law has been gradually taking shape since
then.117
Thanks to more than thirty years of reform oriented toward a
market economy, Chinese economic and business laws have undergone
a thorough transformation, and are more closely in line with norms in

109. See CECC, Legislative transparency of China’s NPC, CONGRESSIONALEXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA, http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/gov/
legistransp.php (last visited Apr. 11, 2011).
110. See Clarke, supra note 105.
111. Id.
112. See Cohen, supra note 106, at 36.
113. The current Chief Justice Wang Shengjun was born in 1946 and holds a
bachelor’s degree in history. He does not have a law degree. The inadequacy of his
educational background for the position of a country’s Chief Justice should be viewed
against the background that most people in his generation were deprived of the
opportunity of higher education, due to destructive turmoils brought by the Cultural
Revolution (1966-76). Justice Wang’s profile is viewable at the official English
website of the Supreme People’s Court, http://en.chinacourt.org/.
114. See Cohen, supra note 106, at 37.
115. Id. at 38.
116. See Joan Liu, Finding Chinese Law on the Internet, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF LAW, http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/China.htm (last visited Apr.
11, 2011).
117. Id.
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advanced countries, compared with other branches of law.118
Nonetheless, a Western-trained lawyer should note that although the
country has decisively transitioned from a centrally planned economy to
a market-oriented one, the state maintains a heavy presence in the
economy, and the interconnection between politics and economics is
much less subtle than what one would typically find in the West. There
is scantly a literal or metaphorical firewall between politics and business
like the one in the United States: the political and business elites in the
United States are effectively separated by the 230-mile physical distance
between Washington and New York, whereas in China, they rub elbows
in the same town,119 a fact that may be partially responsible for the
inordinate expansion of Beijing. The government and the Party
routinely wage campaigns against corruption,120 which is among the top
complaints of the Chinese people, only to see the situation getting worse
and worse.121
In a simplified version of China’s legislative hierarchy suitable for
discussion in this Note, Chinese law has three levels.122 On the top are
“national laws” adopted by the NPC and promulgated by the President.
On the second level are the “administrative regulations” adopted by the
State Council.123 On the third level are the “administrative rules”

118.
119.

See Wang & Huang, infra note 127, at 1.
As an illustration, in 2009, the top six cities as ranked by number of global 500
companies were Tokyo (51), Paris (27), Beijing (26), New York (18), London (15) and
Seoul (11). Global 500 2009: Cities, FORTUNE, http://money.cnn.com/magazines/
fortune/global500/2009/cities/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2011).
120. See Dexter Roberts, China’s Ruling Party Vows to Root Out Corruption, BUS.
WK., Mar. 10, 2011, available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/
content/11_12/b4220013645558.htm. A recent high-profile corruption case was the
downfall of Liu Zhijun, former Minister of Railways, in February 2011. Liu had been
overseeing the extraordinary development of high-speed railways in China, which has
captured global attention. See Edward Wong, China’s Railway Minister Loses Post in
Corruption Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2011, at A8.
121. See Minxin Pei, Corruption Threatens China’s Future, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT
FOR
INT’L PEACE POLICY BRIEF, No. 55, Oct. 2007, available at
http://carnegieendowment.org/2007/10/09/corruption-threatens-china-s-future/g4.
122. See Legislation Law (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 15, 2000,
effective July 1, 2000) chs. 2, 3, and 4.
123. XIANFA art. 89, § 1 (1982) (amended 1988, 1993, 1999 and 2004) (China)
(empowering the State Council to “adopt administrative measures, enact administrative
rules and regulations and issue decisions and orders in accordance with the Constitution
and the law.”).
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adopted by the ministries and commissions under the State Council.124
Then, the same hierarchy is replicated down at the provincial and
municipal levels, and because of China’s unitary polity, national laws in
principle trump provincial and local laws when conflict exists.125
The counsel who advises an American private equity firm doing
business in China is likely to be concerned about the following laws,
regulations and rules, all of which were made after 2005 (the dates of
effectuation are in parentheses):
●National laws (adopted by the NPC and its Standing Committee):
○Company Law (January 1, 2006)
○Securities Law (January 1, 2006)
○Partnership Enterprise Law (June 1, 2007)
○Enterprise Bankruptcy Law (June 1, 2007)
○Anti-Monopoly Law (August 1, 2008)
●Administrative regulations (adopted by the State Council):
○Foreign Exchange Regulation (August 5, 2008)
○Foreign-Invested Partnership (“FIP”) Regulation (March 1,
2010)
●Administrative rules (adopted by ministries and commissions
under the State Council):
○The “2006 M&A Rules”:
▪Administrative Measures on Strategic Investments in
Listed Companies by Foreign Investors (“Foreign
Strategic Investment Measures”) (January 31, 2006)
▪Administrative Measures on the Takeover of Listed
Companies (September 1, 2006)
▪Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic
Enterprises by Foreign Investors (“Foreign M&A
Provisions”) (September 8, 2006)
○Foreign Investment Industrial Guidance Catalogue
(December 1, 2007)

124. Id. art. 90 (empowering ministries and commissions under the State Council to
“issue orders, directives and regulations within the jurisdiction of their respective
departments and in accordance with the law and the administrative rules and
regulations, decisions and orders issued by the State Council.”).
125. For an interesting (and many see as groundbreaking) case involving a conflict
between national and provincial laws, see Jim Yardley, A Judge Tests China’s Court,
Making History, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2005, at A1.
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COMPANY LAW
The new Company Law126 represents a complete revision of the old
Company Law (adopted in 1993): out of 229 articles of the old
Company Law, 46 were deleted and 137 were amended; in addition, 41
new articles were added.127 The reform is intended to bring China’s
Company Law more closely in line with its counterparts in developed
economies.128
The reform introduces several important measures to enhance
managerial accountability, addressing board composition, the role and
responsibilities of directors, the protection of minority shareholders, and
shareholder remedies.129
One significant development is the
introduction of the derivative suit. The new Company Law sets out the
circumstances under which the court may allow shareholders to bring
derivative action130 and the procedures for doing so.131
Chapter Eleven (Articles 192 to 198) of the new Company Law is
titled “Branches of Foreign Companies,” which specifies that “[t]he
branch of a foreign company established within the territory of China
does not have the status of a legal person. The foreign company shall
bear civil liabilities for the business operation of its branches undertaken
within the territory of China.”132 Direct foreign investment in China
may be carried out in three forms: a wholly foreign owned enterprise,133
a contractual joint venture,134 or an equity joint venture.135

126. Gongsi Fa [Company Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
People’s Cong., Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006).
127. Baoshu Wang & Hui Huang, China’s New Company Law and Securities Law:
An Overview and Assessment, 10 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 1, 3-4 (2006).
128. Id. at 1.
129. Id. at 6-8.
130. Company Law art. 150.
131. Id. art. 152.
132. Id. art. 196.
133. Waizi Qiye Fa [Foreign-funded Enterprise Law] (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 31, 2000, effective Oct. 31, 2000).
134. Zhongwai Hezuo Jingying Qiye Fa [Chinese-Foreign Contractual Joint Venture
Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 31, 2000,
effective Oct. 31, 2000).
135. Zhongwai Hezi Jingying Qiye Fa [Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Venture Law]
(promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 15, 2001, effective Mar. 15, 2001).
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SECURITIES LAW
The new Securities Law,136 adopted at the same NPC session as the
new Company Law, is significant in several aspects.137 First, the new
law opens the door for the development of financial derivatives,138 and
lays the foundation for the establishment of multi-level securities
markets in China.139 Second, the new law strengthens the regulation of
the issuing and trading of securities to further promote investor
protection.140 Third, in order to enhance the efficacy of the regulatory
regime, the new law gives regulators more powers to perform their
duties.141
The new Securities Law increases the role of the exchanges as selfregulators by giving them the power to list and delist companies and
temporarily suspend trading securities142 according to China Securities
Regulatory Commission (“CSRC”) procedures, as well as formally
defining the exchanges as self-regulatory organizations.143 In 2009, the
CSRC further solidified such changes in its administrative licensing
procedural rules.144
PARTNERSHIP ENTERPRISE LAW
The amended Partnership Enterprise Law145 is viewed as an
important step towards a more pro-investment corporate law, because it
significantly alters existing partnership rules and principles established
under the original Partnership Law enacted in 1997.146 The new
Partnership Law made significant changes in several respects: (1)
136. Zhengquan Fa [Securities Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
People’s Cong., Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006).
137. Wang & Huang, supra note 127, at 9-10.
138. Securities Law art. 42, 142.
139. Id. art. 39.
140. Id. art. 67, 74, 134.
141. Id. art. 180.
142. Id. art. 55, 56.
143. Id. art. 102.
144. See SCOTT, supra note 26, at 1165.
145. Hehuo Qiye Fa [Partnership Enterprise Law] (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 27, 2006, effective June 1, 2007).
146. Recent PRC Partnership Law Amendments: Domestic Changes Significant,
Little Immediate Impact Seen on Foreign Private Equity Investment, CHINA UPDATE
(Morrison Foerster, San Francisco, CA), June 2007, at 1.
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Limited liability partnership (“LLP”): under the old Partnership Law,
only unlimited liability partnerships were permissible. The amended
Partnership Law now permits investors to establish LLPs;147 (2) Legal
person partners: the old Partnership Law required partners to a
partnership to be individuals. The amended Partnership Law allows
both legal persons and individuals to invest in partnerships;148 (3)
Bankruptcy: it was previously unclear whether a partnership could be
forced into bankruptcy under the old Partnership Law. The amended
Partnership Law gives creditors of LLPs the option, when the
partnership is unable to meet its obligations, either to apply to the
people’s court for bankruptcy liquidation, or to claim directly against the
general partners;149 (4) Pass-through taxation: the amended Partnership
Law expressly exempts partnerships from paying income tax, and taxes
the income to partners on a pass-through basis.150 The adoption of the
Partnership Law spurred the extraordinary development of China’s
private equity industry by encouraging more new firms to adopt the
partnership structure, which is inherently more suitable for private
equity investments.151
The amended Partnership Law specifies “The measures for the
administration on the establishment of partnership enterprises by foreign
enterprises or individuals shall be formulated by the State Council.”152
This is essentially a carve-out; the State Council only filled in this gap
with its own rule three years later.153
ENTERPRISE BANKRUPTCY LAW
The Enterprise Bankruptcy Law,154 adopted at the same NPC
session as the Partnership Enterprise Law, makes China the first Asian

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Partnership Enterprise Law art. 2.
Id. art. 2.
Id. art. 92.
Id. art. 6.
See Joel H. Rothstein, RMB Funds: The Evolving Role of Foreign Investors and
Fund Managers in China, PH PERSPECTIVES (Paul Hastings, Los Angeles, CA), Jan.
2010, at 1.
152. Partnership Enterprise Law art. 108.
153. See FIP Regulation, infra note 167.
154. Qiye Pochan Fa [Enterprise Bankruptcy Law] (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 27, 2006, effective June 1, 2007).
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country to adopt an American-style bankruptcy system.155 In contrast to
the old regime, under which liquidation is the sole bankruptcy
mechanism, the new law, for the first time, shifts its focus to corporate
reorganization and introduces many concepts primarily borrowed from
Chapter Eleven of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.156 The new law also
entitles foreign owners and creditors for the first time in modern Chinese
history to assert rights to assets they own in China.157
ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW
Adopted after a near thirteen-year drafting process, the AntiMonopoly Law158 is China’s first comprehensive antitrust legislation,
and has been hailed as a milestone in China’s march towards a market
economy.159 The difficulty in drafting, adjudication and enforcement of
this law is partly because the ideas behind anti-monopoly are inherently
at odds with traditional Chinese culture that tends to be more tolerant of
concentration of power, although this is too simplistic a statement that
apparently does not do justice to the full complexity of this issue.160
The foregoing discussion shows that the country’s most basic
economic laws – Company Law, Securities Law, Partnership Enterprise
Law, Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, and Anti-Monopoly Law – were not
enacted until after 2005 (although the old Company Law and Securities
Law were made in 1993 and 1998, respectively, they were completely
revised in 2005). By contrast, in the United States, the Sherman
Antitrust Act was passed in 1890, and the major securities laws were
enacted in 1933 and 1934. The notion of “rule of law” is relatively new
to the Chinese who have been living in a Confucian, relationship-based

155. Shu-Ching Jean Chen, China’s Bankruptcy Big Bang, FORBES, June 12, 2007,
available at http://www.forbes.com/2007/06/12/china-bankruptcy-law-face-marketscx_jc_0612autofacescan01.html.
156. David Patrick Eich & Chuan Li, Private Equity Investments in China: Impact
of Recent Legal Reforms, VENTURE CAPITAL REVIEW, Issue 18, Winter 2007, at 35-36.
157. Enterprise Bankruptcy Law art. 5.
158. Fan Longduan Fa [Anti-Monopoly Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008).
159. Wentong Zheng, China’s Anti-Monopoly Law – One Year Down, ANTITRUST
AND COMPETITION POLICY BLOG (Oct. 6, 2009), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/
antitrustprof_blog/2009/10/chinas-antimonopoly-lawone-year-down.html.
160. Id.
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system for two thousand years.161
FOREIGN EXCHANGE REGULATION
On August 5, 2008, the State Council adopted the second
amendment of the Foreign Exchange Regulation.162 The Regulation
adopts a more balanced control mechanism for both the inflow and the
outflow of foreign exchanges in China, and tightens supervision of the
cross-border capital flows.163 The old foreign exchange rules, first
issued by the State Council in January 1996 and subsequently amended
in January 1997, laid out the fundamental foreign exchange policy and
legal framework in China, and specified that the RMB is freely
convertible for current account transactions, whereas any conversion
between RMB and foreign currencies for any capital account
transactions require State Administration of Foreign Exchange
(“SAFE”) approval or registration.164 Because of the shortage of foreign
currencies at that time, the old rules maintained a strict control on the
outflow of foreign currencies but adopted a flexible approach to
facilitate their inflow.165
Because of the rapidly growing size of China’s foreign exchange
reserves, the new rules tighten restrictions on currency inflow and relax
the approach to outflow, even though the fundamental foreign exchange
administration framework established by the old rules remains
unchanged.166
FOREIGN INVESTED-PARTNERSHIP (“FIP”) REGULATION
The FIP Regulation167 has been a long time in coming. Eagerly
161. KENNETH LIEBERTHAL, GOVERNING CHINA: FROM REVOLUTION THROUGH
REFORM 4 (W.W. Norton 2nd ed. 2004).
162. Waihui Guanli Tiaoli [Regulation on Foreign Exchange Administration]
(promulgated by the St. Council, Aug. 5, 2008, effective Aug. 5, 2008) [hereinafter
Foreign Exchange Regulation].
163. David Dai, China Adopts a More Balanced Foreign Exchange Control, CHINA
LAW ALERT (MWE China Law Offices, Shanghai, China), Nov. 2008, at 1.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Waiguo Qiye huo Geren zai Zhongguo Jingnei Sheli Hehuo Qiye Guanli Banfa
[Administrative Measures on the Establishment of Partnership Enterprise by Foreign
Enterprises or Individuals in China] (promulgated by the St. Council, Nov. 25, 2009,
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anticipated by foreign investors and attorneys as early as in 2007, it was
not enacted by the State Council until August 19, 2009, and another
three months went by before the Premier promulgated the Regulation.
The FIP Regulation represents an important step toward a national-law
level framework permitting foreign investors to utilize a PRC
partnership structure to form onshore RMB private equity funds,168 and
triggered prompt actions from foreign private equity firms like
Carlyle.169 Like the Partnership Law that came into effect on June 1,
2007, the FIP Regulation contains a prominent carve-out: “[i]n the event
China has other provisions for the establishment of partnership
enterprises by foreign enterprises or individuals in China with
investment as the main business, it should be subject to those
provisions” (emphasis added).170
THE “2006 M&A RULES”
The “2006 M&A Rules” refer to three rules: Administrative
Measures on Strategic Investments in Listed Companies by Foreign
Investors (“Foreign Strategic Investment Measures”),171 Administrative
Measures on the Takeover of Listed Companies,172 and Provisions on
Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors

effective Mar. 1, 2010) [hereinafter FIP Regulation].
168. See Draft Foreign-Invested Partnership Regulation – New Possibilities for
Global Funds in China? CHINA MATTERS (Paul Hastings, Los Angeles, CA), Sept.
2009, at 3.
169. See Rick Carew & Dinny McMahon, Carlyle Joins With Beijing to Launch a
New Fund, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 2010, available at http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB10001424052748704055104574653132375745034.html?mod=WSJ_Bonds_
RIGHTMoreInMarkets.
170. FIP Regulation art. 14. Private equity firms likely belong to the category of
enterprises “with investments as the main business.”
171. Waiguo Touzizhe dui Shangshi Gongsi Zhanlve Touzi Guanli Banfa
[Administrative Measures on Strategic Investments in Listed Companies by Foreign
Investors] (promulgated by the Ministry of Com., the China Sec. Reg. Comm’n, the
State Admin. of Tax’n, the State Admin. for Indus. & Com., and the State Admin. of
Foreign Exch., Dec. 31, 2005, effective Jan. 31, 2006) [hereinafter Foreign Strategic
Investment Measures].
172. Shangshi Gongsi Shougou Guanli Banfa [Administrative Measures on the
Takeover of Listed Companies] (promulgated by the China Sec. Reg. Comm’n, July 31,
2006, effective Sept. 1, 2006) (amended Aug. 27, 2008).
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(“Foreign M&A Provisions,” commonly known as “Circular 10”).173
Circular 10 arrived at the height of the national debate on Carlyle’s
planned 85% investment in Xugong Group, a construction machinery
manufacturer, and it probably caused Carlyle to drop the bid in the
end.174 To the dismay of China’s small and medium-sized private
companies that had experienced great difficulty securing loans from
state-owned banks, Circular 10 also effectively sealed off an important
overseas funding channel for them,175 the “red chip” model.176
It is crucial to understand the roles and responsibilities of the key
government agencies that enact and enforce these rules: the Ministry of
Commerce (“MOFCOM”) supervises and approves foreign investments;
the National Development and Reform Commission (“NDRC”)
approves foreign investment project application; the State-owned Assets
Supervision and Administration Commission (“SASAC”) approves and
supervises state-owned targets; the China Securities Regulatory
Commission (“CSRC”) approves and supervises listed companies; the
State Administration for Industry and Commerce (“SAIC”) is
responsible for registration and administration; the State Administration
173. Guanyu Waiguo Touzizhe Binggou Jingnei Qiye de Guiding [Provisions on
Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors] (promulgated
by the Ministry of Com., the State-owned Assets Supervision & Admin. Comm’n, the
State Admin. of Tax’n, the State Admin. for Indus. & Com., the China Sec. Reg.
Comm’n, and the State Admin. of Foreign Exch., Aug. 8, 2006, effective Sept. 8, 2006)
(amended June 22, 2009) [hereinafter Foreign M&A Provisions].
174. See McMahon, supra note 42.
175. See Foreign M&A Provisions, supra note 173, art. 11 (“If any domestic
company, enterprise or natural person merges its affiliated domestic company in the
name of a company legally established or controlled by the aforesaid domestic
company, enterprise or natural person in foreign countries or regions, it shall be subject
to the approval of the MOFCOM”); art. 40 (“Where a special purpose company is to be
listed overseas, the listing shall be approved by the securities regulatory authority under
the State Council”).
176. In a typical red chip model, a Chinese private company sets up a Special
Purpose Vehicle (“SPV”) in a overseas tax haven like the Cayman Islands or the British
Virgin Islands, receives foreign private equity and/or venture capital investment,
merges the original company into that SPV and possibly does an IPO in an overseas
stock exchange. The very onerous and unpredictable approval procedures imposed by
Circular 10 made it very difficult for Chinese private company to complete a red chip
fundraising in subsequent years. See, e.g., Feng Yuding, Hongchou Shangshi Zai Yu
Shihaowen Konghuang [The Red Chip Model Meets Circular 10 Scare Again],
SHANGWU ZHOUKAN [BUSINESS WATCH MAGAZINE], Apr. 25, 2007, available at
http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/t/20070425/14593540249.shtml.
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of Foreign Exchange (“SAFE”) manages and monitors foreign exchange
transactions; the State Administration of Taxation (“SAT”) oversees tax
registration and collection; and other industry-specific regulators.177 The
effectiveness of China’s administrative rulemaking critically depends on
the coordination among these government agencies, whose interests and
ideologies could conflict and thwart the policy objectives.
FOREIGN INVESTMENT INDUSTRIAL GUIDANCE CATALOGUE
Last but not least is the Foreign Investment Industrial Guidance
Catalogue, which divides all potential foreign investments into three
categories: Encouraged, Restricted, and Prohibited (unlisted industry
sectors are deemed to fall into the Permitted category).178 The
categorization is meant to fulfill policy objectives such as upgrading
industrial structure, enhancing resource conservation and environmental
protection, addressing trade surplus and the rapid increase of foreign
exchange reserves, balancing regional development, and protecting
national economic security by applying a “cautiously open” policy to
foreign investment in certain sectors.179

V. ON THE RISE: THE RMB FUND
The RMB fund has been hailed as the “next opportunity” by
international private equity investors desiring to compete in China.180
With the rise of China-based institutional investors and the massive
increase in domestic liquidity, international private equity investors are
finding it increasingly difficult to compete with domestic players for
177. Alex Yong Hao, Founding Director of the Chinese Business Lawyers
Association (“CBLA”), lecture at the Inaugural Seminar of CBLA: China M&A, Joint
Ventures, and Strategic Alliances (June 11, 2009) (on file with author).
178. Waishang Touzi Chanye Zhidao Mulu [Foreign Investment Industrial Guidance
Catalogue] (promulgated by the Nat’l Dev. & Reform Comm’n, and the Ministry of
Com., Oct. 31, 2007, effective Dec. 1, 2007). The 2007 edition of the Catalogue
supersedes previous editions (2004, 2002, 1997, 1995). Our very own profession, legal
service, belongs in the “Restricted” category.
179. Thomas Y. Man, Yan Zeng & Jing (Jean) Sun, Foreign Investment Industry
Catalogue: New Revisions & Alignment with National Development Strategy, CHINA
LAW & PRACTICE, Dec. 2007/Jan. 2008, at 17. The authors are attorneys at Orrick,
Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP. Id.
180. Rothstein, supra note 151, at 1.
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deals. Foreign private equity firms believe that Chinese laws governing
foreign investment put them at a competitive disadvantage to domestic
investors with RMB funding sources.181 In recent years, governmental
regulations have made it increasingly difficult for Chinese companies to
establish offshore ownership structures.182 Therefore, foreign investors
have to come onshore and become subject to a complex and burdensome
foreign investment regulatory regime, under which a foreign investor
generally must set up a special legal entity, called a foreign-invested
enterprise (“FIE”).183 Foreign investors view RMB funds as an
opportunity to avoid the complexities associated with making each
investment as a FIE, and to tap the ever-growing pool of Chinese
individual and institutional investors.184
In August 2009, Blackstone signed an agreement with the
government of Shanghai Pudong New Area to establish the firm’s first
regional private equity fund denominated in renminbi, planning to raise
RMB 5 billion, or $732 million. According to the firm, the Blackstone
Zhonghua Development Investment Fund “will make priority
investments in the Shanghai Pudong New Area, a major focal point for
the Chinese government’s plans to develop a leading international
finance and shipping center in the region as well as in other regions in
China.”185 It was reported that China’s National Social Securities Fund
committed up to 40% of Blackstone’s total target size, or RMB 2 billion
($293 million).186 If true, this would represent the first investment by
the NSSF in an RMB-denominated foreign fund, which would be
subject to special permission from the State Council.
Pursuant to the effectuation of the FIP Regulation as of March 1,

181.
182.

Id.
See supra notes 175, 176. These offshore structures previously provided
convenient platforms for international private equity investments. Id.
183. Rothstein, supra note 151, at 1.
184. Id. See also China RMB Funds: The Far East is Closer than You Think,
PILLSBURY CLIENT ALERT (Pillsbury, New York, NY), Mar. 3, 2009, at 1-2.
185. Zhonghua Development Fund, supra note 83.
186. George Chen & Megan Davies, Blackstone Nails Down Some Commitments to
China Fund, REUTERS (Feb. 25, 2010, 11:43 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/
2010/02/26/us-blackstone-china-idUSTRE61P0T220100226.
As discussed earlier,
NSSF has long been the biggest limited partner in China’s private equity industry,
having contributed to China’s largest private equity funds such as Bohai, CDH, Citic
private equity, Hony, among others. Supra note 85.
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2010, all new RMB funds will most likely adopt the FIP structure.187
The Chinese limited partnership form is attractive because it shares a
number of features with limited partnership vehicles from other
jurisdictions, such as operational flexibility (including flexibility on the
timing and amounts of capital contributions and profit allocations) and
pass-through tax treatment.188 While the establishment of a foreigninvested enterprise in the form of a wholly foreign-owned enterprise, an
equity joint venture or a contractual joint venture is subject to prior
approval from the Ministry of Commerce, the FIP Regulation only
requires registration with appropriate provincial or local branches of the
State Administration of Industry and Commerce.189 In January 2010,
SAIC issued compatible provisions, which went into effect on March 1,
2010, to further regulate the registration procedures with respect to
foreign-invested partnerships.190
The promulgation of the FIP Regulation was an important first step
in making FIPs a reality, and Carlyle clearly took the message to heart.
In January 2010, Carlyle partnered with a subsidiary company of the
Beijing municipal government to raise its first RMB fund, in the amount
of RMB 5 billion, or $732 million.191 Then, on February 24, 2010,

187.
188.
189.

See FIP Regulation, supra note 167.
Rothstein, supra note 151, at 2.
John V. Grobowski & Yiqiang Li, Administrative Measures for the
Establishment of Partnership Enterprises in China by Foreign Enterprises or
Individuals, FAEGRE & BENSON CLIENT ALERTS (Faegre & Bensen, Minneapolis, MN),
Jan. 1, 2010, at 2.
190. Waishang Touzi Hehuo Qiye Dengji Guanli Guiding [Administrative
Provisions on the Registration of Foreign-invested Partnership Enterprises]
(promulgated by the State Admin. for Indus. & Com., Jan. 29, 2010, effective Mar. 1,
2010); Guanyu Zuohao “Waiguo Qiye huo Geren zai Zhongguo Jingnei Sheli Hehuo
Qiye Guanli Banfa” Guanche Shishi Gongzuo de Tongzhi [Notice on Doing a Good Job
in the Implementation of the Foreign-Invested Partnership Regulation] (issued by the
State Admin. for Indus. & Com., Feb. 10, 2010). See also Fang Jian, SAIC Issues Rules
on the Registration of Foreign-invested Partnerships, LINKLATERS CHINA NEWS
(Linklaters, London, UK), Feb. 5, 2010; RMB Private Equity Funds in Foreign-Invested
Partnerships, CHINA MATTERS (Paul Hastings, Los Angeles, CA), Mar. 2010.
191. Carew & McMahon, supra note 169. However, partnering with a government
entity is not a panacea; recently, Carlyle failed to convince the CBRC in its proposed
investment in the Beijing Rural Commercial Bank, despite strong support from its
partner (the subsidiary company of the Beijing municipal government), repeating its
setback in the Chongqing City Commercial Bank. See Wu & Hu, supra note 11; Chen,
supra note 52.
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Carlyle teamed up with Shanghai conglomerate Fosun Group192 to
establish a $100 million jointly held private equity fund based in China
and denominated in renminbi.193 This is reportedly the first business
license granted to a FIP with primary business in private equity
investment, after the FIP Regulation took effect.
In the wake of pioneering moves by Blackstone and Carlyle, TPG
made even bigger splashes in August 2010, announcing that it was
partnering with two of China’s largest cities, Shanghai and Chongqing,
to raise nearly $1.5 billion and create its first two RMB funds.194

VI. NEW OUTLOOK: THE DECADE AHEAD
2010 was an eventful and exciting year for China’s private equity
industry, and some industry leaders see it as marking the beginning of a
new era, the coming of age of the domestic Chinese private equity
companies.195 Such optimism is well founded, although it must also be
qualified.
Several developments on the domestic front are noteworthy: (1)
ChiNext and exit strategy. ChiNext, launched in October 2009, is the
Shenzhen Exchange’s Nasdaq-style second stock exchange. Because it
is easier and faster for small and medium-sized private companies to be
listed on ChiNext, ChiNext has proven to be an important alternative for
private equity fund exit strategies.196 (2) Insurance funds as the new
limited partner. The China Insurance Regulatory Commission issued the
Interim Measures for Equity Investment with Insurance Funds on
September 5, 2010, opening the door for Chinese insurance companies
to invest up to 5% of their total assets in private equity funds.197 (3)
192. Fosun Group is one of the nation’s largest privately held companies, with more
than $10 billion in assets. FOSUN INTERNATIONAL, http://www.fosun.com/en/.
193. James T. Areddy & Joy C. Shaw, Carlyle, Fosun Set Global Ambitions for
Partnership,
MARKETWATCH
(Feb.
24,
2010,
02:37
PM),
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/carlyle-fosun-set-global-ambitions-2010-02-24.
194. David Barboza, TPG to Create Chinese Currency Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24,
2010, at B3.
195. See Liu, supra note 1.
196. Id. Note that in 2010, 96% (or 160 out of 167 cases) of the private equity exits
in the Chinese market occurred through IPO. See ZERO2IPO RESEARCH CENTER, supra
note 2, at 21.
197. Baoxian Zijin Touzi Guquan Zanxing Guanli Banfa [Interim Measures for
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Fund of Funds (“FoF”). China’s first RMB Fund of Funds, Guochuang
FoF, was launched on December 28, 2010. Guochuang FoF was jointly
set up by CDB Capital (a subsidiary of China Development Bank) and
Suzhou Ventures Group.198 The initial size of Guochuang FoF is RMB
15 billion. Guochuang FoF consists of Guochuang Kaiyuan, a private
equity FoF with the initial size of RMB 10 billion, and Guochuang
Yuanhe, a venture capital FoF with the initial size of RMB 5 billion.199
A nationwide legal framework for private equity is gradually taking
shape, and in a series of recent rulemaking such as the FIP Regulation
and the QFLP Program, the authorities seem to be making a conscious
effort to level the playing field for foreign and domestic private equity
firms.
SUPPORTIVE LAWS AND POLICIES
After the FIP Regulation came into effect in March 2010, the State
Council continued the momentum by issuing a slew of opinions and
decisions that together proved to be a big boon for private equity.200
From April to October 2010, the State Council issued Several Opinions
on Better Utilizing Foreign Investment,201 Several Opinions on
Encouraging and Guiding the Healthy Development of Private
Investment,202 Opinions on Promoting Enterprise Merger and

Equity Investment with Insurance Funds] (promulgated by the China Ins. Reg.
Comm’n, July 31, 2010, effective July 31, 2010). As mentioned in Part III, before this
new rule the National Social Security Fund has been the biggest limited partner for
private equity funds in the country.
198. Hu Rongping, Guokai Jinrong Dazao 600 Yi Guochuang Mujijin [CDB Capital
Forges 60 Billion Guochuang FoF], JINGJI GUANCHA BAO [THE ECONOMIC OBSERVER],
Dec. 29, 2010, available at http://www.eeo.com.cn/finance/banking/2010/12/29/
190262.shtml.
199. Id.
200. See supra notes 122-24 for the administrative legislation power vested in the
State Council and its ministries and commissions by the Constitution and the
Legislation Law.
201. Guanyu Jinyibu Zuohao Liyong Waizi Gongzuo de Ruogan Yijian [Several
Opinions on Better Utilizing Foreign Investment] (issued by the St. Council, Apr. 6,
2010).
202. Guanyu Guli he Yindao Minjian Touzi Jiankang Fazhan de Ruogan Yijian
[Several Opinions on Encouraging and Guiding the Healthy Development of Private
Investment] (issued by the St. Council, May 7, 2010).
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Restructuring,203 and Decision on Accelerating the Cultivation and
Development of Strategic New Industries.204 All these opinions and
decisions highlighted “private equity” as an important component of
China’s capital markets and beneficial to the national economy.
These provisions were implemented in the Notice on the Division
of Work among Departments, which was issued by the General Office of
the State Council and further carried out by the ministries, commissions,
and agencies under the State Council.205 For instance, the Ministry of
Commerce’s Notice on Decentralizing the Examination and Approval
Power for Foreign Investment aims to decentralize, simplify and
streamline the approval procedures for foreign investors.206
On January 31, 2011, the National Development and Reform
Commission issued the Notice on Further Regulating the Development
and Filing of Equity Investment Enterprises in Pilot Areas.207 The
Notice provides much-needed guidance on the regulation of RMB
private equity funds, and may mark the beginning of a centrally
administered regulatory framework for such funds.208 Its three most
important provisions are: (1) Registration with the NDRC: subject to
limited exceptions, any equity investment enterprises with registered
capital of more than RMB 500 million and more than one investor must
register with the NDRC if formed in a Pilot Area;209 (2) Fundraising: an

203. Guanyu Cujin Qiye Jianbing Chongzu de Yijian [Opinions on Promoting
Enterprise Merger and Restructuring] (issued by the St. Council, Aug. 28, 2010).
204. Guanyu Jiakuai Peiyu he Fazhan Zhanlvexing Xinxing Chanye de Jueding
[Decision on Accelerating the Cultivation and Development of Strategic New
Industries] (issued by the St. Council, Oct. 10, 2010).
205. Guanche Luoshi Guowuyuan “Guanyu Jinyibu Zuohao Liyong Waizi Gongzuo
de Ruogan Yijian” Bumen Fengong Fang’an [Notice on the Division of Work among
Departments to Implement the “Several Opinions on Better Utilizing Foreign
Investment”] (issued by Gen. Office of the St. Council, Aug. 18, 2010).
206. Guanyu Xiafang Waishang Touzi Shenpi Quanxian Youguan Wenti de
Tongzhi [Notice on Decentralizing the Examination and Approval Power for Foreign
Investment] (issued by the Ministry of Com., June 10, 2010).
207. Guanyu Jinyibu Guifan Shidian Diqu Guquan Touzi Qiye Fazhan he Bei’an
Guanli Gongzuo de Tongzhi [Notice on Further Regulating the Development and Filing
of Equity Investment Enterprises in Pilot Areas] (issued by the Nat’l Dev. & Reform
Comm’n, Jan. 31, 2011) [hereinafter NDRC Notice on Equity Investment].
208. John R. Fadely, Helen Jiang & Catherine Yang, NDRC Notice Regarding RMB
Funds Provides Guidance on the Regulation of China’s Domestic Private Equity
Industry, ASIA ALERT (Weil Gotshal, New York, NY), Mar. 2011.
209. The Pilot Areas include Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang and
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equity investment enterprise may raise capital only through a private
placement to investors that are capable of assessing and bearing the risks
of an investment in the equity investment enterprise;210 (3) Investment
restrictions: equity investment enterprises must be established in
accordance with applicable PRC laws and may invest only in shares and
equity interests that are not publicly traded.211
QUALIFIED FOREIGN LIMITED PARTNERS AND
THE SHANGHAI PILOT PROGRAM
The QFLP has been long expected, and the announcement came in
November 2010 that Shanghai, Beijing and Tianjin had been granted
special status to accept QFLP as private equity investors.212 Under the
QFLP, each of the cities will have its own foreign quota for the amount
allowed to be converted from foreign to domestic currency for the
purpose of private equity funds.213 The QFLP allows foreign investors
to bring in foreign capital to convert into domestic currency, but the
amount must not be more than 50% of the ultimate size of the fund.214
The QFLP parallels the QFII (Qualified Foreign Institutional
Investors)215, a program that was launched in 2002 to allow licensed
foreign investors to buy and sell A shares in China’s mainland stock
exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen. Both QFLP and QFII are avenues
for foreign investors to participate in the Chinese market, under China’s
capital control regime.216
Hubei. See NDRC Notice on Equity Investment, supra note 207, art. 5.
210. Id., art. 1.
211. Id.
212. The Floodgate: Three Cities to Test the QFLP Scheme, ASIA PRIVATE EQUITY
REV. GREATER CHINA EDITION, Dec. 2010, available at http://www.asiape.com/apergc/
apergc_issues/apergc1012.html.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. As of June 2010, 96 foreign entities have been approved as QFIIs. Sixteen of
them are from the United States, including Harvard, Yale, Columbia and Stanford
universities. See QFII Directory, CHINA SECURITIES REGULATORY COMMISSION,
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/zjhpublic/G00306208/201006/t20100610_181348.htm (last
visited Apr. 1, 2011).
216. Liu Xue & Wang He, Shanghai Shuaixian Kaifang Waishang Touzi PE
Zhengce, Renminbi Zibenxiang Kaifang Zai Maibu [Shanghai Takes the Lead in
Opening Policies for Foreign Private Equity Investment, Renminbi Capital Account
Liberalization Makes Another Stride], XINHUA [XINHUA], Jan. 12, 2011.
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In early January 2011, the Shanghai Municipal Financial Services
Office,217 Shanghai Municipal Commission of Commerce and the
Shanghai Municipal Administration for Industry and Commerce jointly
issued the Implementation Measures on Pilot Program of ForeignInvested Equity Investment Enterprises in Shanghai (“Pilot
Measures”).218 Under the Pilot Program, qualified foreign investors can
apply to convert foreign currency into renminbi, which they can directly
invest in private equity funds based in Shanghai. The program would
allow the investors to bypass China’s tough restrictions on bringing
funds into the country for financial investments — limits that are part of
China’s capital control regime.219
The governing body of the Pilot Program is the Joint Conference
for Pilot Program of Equity-Investment Foreign Invested Enterprises
(“Joint Conference”), which is composed of various working units that
represent interests of the Shanghai government and the State.220 The
State Administration of Foreign Exchange has enlisted its Shanghai
branch, the Shanghai SAFE, to control matters arising from foreign
exchange issues when the Pilot Measures are implemented.221 SAFE’s
presence suggests that investments made by funds formed under the
Pilot Measures may still have to be approved by and reported to
SAFE.222
QFLP and the Shanghai Pilot Program are considered major policy
217. Dr. Fang Xinghai directs the Shanghai Municipal Financial Services Office.
Fang holds a B.S. in economics (1986) from Tsinghua University, and a Ph.D. in
economics (1993) from Stanford University. Fang worked for the World Bank for five
years, before returning to China to work for the China Construction Bank (1998-2000),
the Galaxy Securities (2000-01), the Shanghai Stock Exchange (2001-05), and the
Shanghai Financial Services Office since 2005. See Fang Xinghai, CHINA VITAE,
http://www.chinavitae.com/biography/Fang_Xinghai (last visited Apr. 1, 2011).
218. Guanyu Benshi Kaizhan Waishang Touzi Guquan Touzi Qiye Shidian
Gongzuo de Shishi Banfa [Implementation Measures on Pilot Program of ForeignInvested Equity Investment Enterprises in Shanghai] (promulgated by the Shanghai
Mun. Fin. Serv. Office, the Shanghai Mun. Comm’n of Com., and the Shanghai Mun.
Admin. for Ind. & Com., Dec. 24, 2010, effective Jan. 24, 2011) [hereinafter Pilot
Measures].
219. Dinny McMahon, Shanghai Loosens Rules for Foreigners in Private Equity,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 13, 2011, at C2.
220. Pilot Measures art. 4.
221. Id.
222. The Breakthrough, ASIA PRIVATE EQUITY REV. GREATER CHINA EDITION, Feb.
2011, available at http://www.asiape.com/apergc/apergc_issues/apergc1102.html.

882

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XVI

breakthroughs because of China’s longstanding capital control, which is
implemented by the SAFE. China has long maintained a fully
convertible current account and a selectively convertible capital account
that favors liberalizing long-term capital flows while restricting shortterm capital flows.223 For instance, SAFE’s “Circular 142” prohibits the
conversion of foreign exchange into renminbi for equity investment
purposes.224 The new measures portend simplification of the process
and relaxation of certain restrictions, but the actual effect may depend on
many variables.
Private equity has undergone significant growth in China in the past
ten years, and the momentum is likely to continue in the new decade. A
nationwide legal framework governing private equity is now on the
horizon. The FIP Regulation that came into effect in March 2010 made
it easier for foreign private equity firms to set up RMB funds and
directly tap into local resources,225 and the QFLP pilot program in
Shanghai in January 2011 marks the beginning of a new era in which
China welcomes foreign investors to enter its vast private equity market
under established rules.226 These new legal developments will likely
foster a level playing field for foreign and domestic private equity firms.
Domestic firms have turned from apprentices into real competitors,
attracting top talents from foreign firms.227 The game just got more
interesting.

CONCLUSION
Observing China’s fledging private equity industry is intellectually

223. China has been reluctant to make its capital account fully convertible because
its financial system is still immature. China’s current account has been fully
convertible since 1996. See Foreign Exchange Regulation, supra note 162, art. 5 (“The
state imposes no restrictions on international payments and transfers of current account
transactions.”).
224. Guanyu Wanshan Waishang Touzi Qiye Waihui Zibenjin Zhifu Jiehui Guanli
Youguan Yewu Caozuo Wenti de Tongzhi [Notice on Relevant Operational Issues
Concerning Improving the Administration of the Payment and Settlement of Foreign
Exchange Capital of Foreign-funded Enterprises] (issued by the State Admin. of
Foreign Exch., Aug. 29, 2008) art. 3.
225. See Rothstein, supra note 151, at 1.
226. See The Breakthrough, supra note 222.
227. See Sender, supra note 71.
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stimulating. Private equity was little known in China merely ten years
ago, but now it has firmly established itself as part of the country’s
increasingly multi-layered capital markets. This study of the brief legal
and financial history of the Chinese private equity industry has two
broad implications.
First, the development of a legal framework for private equity in
China is closely tied with the country’s economic fundamentals.228
Private equity boomed because there was a gap to fill in China’s
financial system, which had long been dominated by the country’s stateowned banks. A large number of entrepreneurial, private companies
with high growth potential flourished in reaction to the country’s
liberalization policies, but many have experienced great difficulties
securing funds from state-owned banks.229 Chinese savers, who want
better returns on their investments, and entrepreneurs, who need capital,
are keen on bypassing the big banks. Over time, the government also
realized the significance of weaning the country’s economy off an
overdependence on bank lending.230 Private equity came just in time.
In the future, the prosperity of foreign private equity firms in China
will continue to hinge on the country’s economic circumstances and
policies, and in particular, policies regarding the renminbi. Foreign
private equity firms will stay competitive in China only if they tap the
ever-growing pool of wealthy Chinese individuals and institutional
investors, and achieve flexibility on the timing and amount of capital
contributions and profit allocation through their own RMB funds.231
Therefore, foreign private equity firms will benefit from a Chinese
economic policy that gradually loosens foreign exchange control and in
the long term makes the country’s capital account fully convertible. A
fully convertible capital account is a prerequisite for the renminbi to
become a global currency, which seems to be China’s long-term goal.232
228. The legal and economic histories of other countries have shown the same. In
the United States, for example, the Securities Act of 1933 came in the aftermath of the
stock market crash of 1929 and during the ensuing Great Depression, and Regulation D
(discussed in Part I) was a response to conditions of the 1970s that made it
unnecessarily difficult for small businesses to raise capital. See COX, HILLMAN &
LANGEVOORT, supra note 22, at 281.
229. See Private Equity in China: Barbarians in Love, supra note 3.
230. See McMahon, supra note 219, at C2.
231. See Rothstein, supra note 151, at 2.
232. See Lingling Wei, New Move to Make Yuan a Global Currency, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 12, 2011, at A1 (quoting remarks from Li Xiaojing, general manager of Bank of
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Then again, only a global currency is compatible with the “going-out”
plan now championed by leading Chinese enterprises, state-owned or
privately-held. This was clearly in the mind of China’s central
bankers233 when the bank issued its very first Public Notice of 2011 to
promulgate the Administrative Measures for the Pilot RMB Settlement
of Outward Direct Investment.234 Around the same time, Bank of
China’s New York branch launched renminbi trading in the United
States for the first time, expanding the nascent offshore renminbi market
that began last year in Hong Kong.235 Commentators see these as solid
steps toward a more convertible Chinese currency.236
Second, private equity offers a unique lens for understanding
China’s legal system. As this Note examines, administrative legislation
and rulemaking237 have played a pivotal role in the development of
China’s private equity industry, and more recently, in leveling the
playing field for foreign and domestic private equity firms. The
effective rulemaking by the State Council and its ministries and
commissions is a key source of strength at the current stage of China’s
economic development. In fact, it is tempting to think that this system
China’s New York branch that “we’re preparing for the day when renminbi becomes
fully convertible.”); David Barboza, In China, Tentative Steps Toward Global
Currency, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2011, at B1 (quoting remarks from Robert A. Mundell,
a Nobel laureate economist, that “the renminbi was already a regional currency in
Southeast Asia, where China had become the dominant trading partner of many
countries.”).
233. Some officials at the People’s Bank of China have substantial overseas
experiences. Yi Gang, Deputy Governor of the PBOC, received his Ph.D. in economics
from the University of Illinois in 1986, and became a tenured Associate Professor at
Indiana University in 1992. Yi returned to teach at Peking University in 1994, joined
the PBOC in 1997 and rose through the ranks at the central bank. He had been in
charge of China’s monetary policy and foreign exchange administration. See Yi Gang,
PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA, http://www.pbc.gov.cn/publish/english/1011/index.html (last
visited Apr. 1, 2011). A younger official, Li Bo, now head of the PBOC’s Monetary
Policy Department II (overseeing the globalization of renminbi), graduated from
Renmin University of China, received his Ph.D. in economics from Stanford and J.D.
from Harvard Law School, and has worked at Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP.
234. Jingwai Zhijie Touzi Renminbi Jiesuan Shidian Guanli Banfa [Administrative
Measures for the Pilot RMB Settlement of Outward Direct Investment] (promulgated by
the People’s Bank of China, Jan. 6, 2011, effective Jan. 6, 2011).
235. Wei, supra note 232, at A1.
236. See, e.g., Barboza, supra note 232, at B1.
237. Such powers are granted by the Constitution to the State Council and its
ministries and commissions. See supra notes 123 and 124.
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possesses some of the advantages typically associated with the common
law system – flexibility and nimbleness – only that those who assigned
such attributes to the system are not the judges, but government
officials. The officials who made and implemented the recent private
equity-friendly rules have been credited with their responsiveness and
adeptness at fine-tuning, or, in the words of the late Deng Xiaoping
(1904 - 1997), “crossing the river by feeling the stones.”238
The administrative rulemaking system is at its best when the
ministries and commissions under the State Council coordinate with
each other to carry out stated policy objectives. Conversely, in cases
where lack of communication, or worse, conflicts of interest arise among
various agencies, a confusing patchwork of laws and regulations
ensues.239 Because of the experimental nature of China’s economic
reform, such inefficiencies are not at all uncommon. Inter-agency
conflicts of interest run the gamut from mostly monetary to largely
ideological. For example, as the 2006 M&A Rules240 demonstrate, the
struggle between economic liberalism and protectionism has been a
perennial hot button, and constantly redefines the boundaries of what
foreign private equity firms (as well as other financial institutions) can
and cannot do in China.241
Looking beyond administrative legislation and rulemaking, we
encounter a more fundamental question of the Chinese legal system.
Like other East Asian countries during their economic takeoffs, the
Chinese system vests enormous discretion in the administrative agencies
that make and implement the regulatory schemes.242 Unlike Japan,
which adopted a democratic polity after Word War II, or South Korea,
which transformed itself into a democracy in late 1980s, the inherent
lack of checks and balances in China’s current political system continues
to breed abuse of power and other “systemic risk,” to borrow the term
from finance.243
238. See, e.g., Cong “Mozhe Shitou Guohe” Dao Gaige “Dingceng Sheji” [From
“Crossing the River by Feeling the Stones” to Reforming “Top-Floor Design”], DIYI
CAIJING RIBAO [CHINA BUSINESS NETWORK], Mar. 9, 2011, available at
http://money.163.com/11/0309/06/6UMDKE4T00252G50.html.
239. See Corne, supra note 107, at 370.
240. See supra notes 171 to 173.
241. See McMahon, supra note 42.
242. John Ohnesorge, Chinese Administrative Law in the Northeast Asia Mirror, 16
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS, 103, 111 (2006).
243. See Pei, supra note 121, at 5-6.
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As discussed in Part IV, the polity of the People’s Republic of
China rejects the notion of horizontal separation of powers between the
executive, legislative and judicial branches of the government.244
China’s legislature, the National People’s Congress, only makes the
country’s basic laws.245 Even the country’s most basic economic laws
have not been enacted until very recently, and “rule of law” in the
Western sense is a new notion to the Chinese who have been living in a
Confucian, relationship-based system for two thousand years.246
Although the Chinese Constitution also confers supervisory power to the
People’s Congress,247 in reality, the institutional infrastructure
supporting the exercise of such power is very limited.248 For one thing,
the NPC is not a professionalized representative body, and its three
thousand or so delegates only convene for ten days each year.
The Chinese judiciary is not independent and is institutionally
weak.249 Under current circumstances, it is unrealistic to expect the
Chinese judiciary to play the kind of role as their U.S. counterparts and
move the society forward with landmark decisions, although some
scholars, drawing lessons from the Japanese courts, have advocated for
the Chinese courts to play a more openly political role in major social
conflicts.250
Many scholars see a political system lacking checks and balances as
responsible for some of China’s most troubling problems, such as
widespread government corruption, and the ever-widening income
disparity among different social and political groups.251 Recently,
private equity has been under intense criticism for being a tool of
enriching the country’s political establishment, so much so that people
244.
245.

See Clarke, supra note 105.
XIANFA art. 62 § 3 (1982) (amended Apr. 12, 1988, Mar. 29, 1993, Mar. 15,
1999, Mar. 14, 2004) (China).
246. See LIEBERTHAL, supra note 161, at 4.
247. PRC STATE COUNCIL, WHITE PAPER: BUILDING OF POLITICAL DEMOCRACY IN
CHINA (2005), Ch. 3, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-10/19/
content_3645750.htm.
248. For an interesting discussion, see Guobin Zhu, Constitutional Review in China:
An Unaccomplished Project or a Mirage? 43 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 625 (2010) (arguing
that the Chinese “constitutional review” system vests the reviewing power in the
legislature instead of courts).
249. See Cohen, supra note 106, at 36.
250. See Frank K. Upham, Reflections on the Rule of Law in China, 6 NAT’L
TAIWAN U. L. Rev. (forthcoming Sept. 2011).
251. See Pei, supra note 121, at 5.
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now joke that “PE” stands for “princes’ enterprise.”252 This new
development is worrying because it breeds injustice, inequality and
social instability,253 and undermines the foundation of a “neutral
government” that some argue has been at the helm of China’s reform in
the past three decades.254
How the Chinese legal system may evolve is obviously beyond the
scope of this Note. However, private equity provides a captivating lens
for making fresh discoveries about contemporary China. Along with the
whole set of presumptions of the market economy (e.g., equal
participation, transparency, rule of law) that it is embedded in, private
equity is becoming a new force in shaping China’s economic, legal and
political future.

252.
253.

See Carew, supra note 103.
See, e.g., Carl F. Minzner, Xinfang: An Alternative to Formal Chinese Legal
Institutions, 42 STAN. J. INT’L L. 103 (2006); Katherine Wilhelm, Rethinking Property
Rights in Urban China, 9 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 227 (2004).
254. See Yang Yao, The End of the Beijing Consensus, FOREIGN AFF., Feb. 2, 2010,
at 1, available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65947/the-end-of-the-beijingconsensus. Professor Yao is Deputy Dean of the National School of Development and
Director of the China Center for Economic Research at Peking University. According
to Professor Yao, “China has for three decades been ruled by a disinterested
government – a detached, unbiased regime that takes a neutral stance when conflicts of
interest arise among different social and political groups. This does not mean that
Beijing has been devoid of self-interest. On the contrary, the state is often predatory
toward citizens, but its predation is ‘identity-blind’ in the sense that Beijing does not
generally care about the social and political status of its chosen prey – unlike many
governments elsewhere that act to protect and enrich specific social or political groups.
As a consequence, the Chinese government has been more likely than other
authoritarian regimes to adopt growth-enhancing policies.” (emphasis added). Id.
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APPENDIX: ACRONYMS FOR CHINESE PROPER NAMES
Because the literal translations of China-related entity names tend
to be long, they are often shortened to their acronyms. Over time, these
acronyms entered the lexicon of English-speaking financial
professionals, lawyers and academics alike. Many of these acronyms
became an integral part of these entities’ logos, and are used far more
often than the original translations (just like the way American private
equity firm TPG changed its official name from the original “Texas
Pacific Group” to a nondescript, non-geographic, TPG in 2003). Listed
below are the names that have appeared in the Note.

GOVERNMENT ENTITIES
● People’s Republic of China (PRC)
● National People’s Congress (NPC)
● Communist Party of China (CPC), or Chinese Communist Party
(CCP)
● National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC)
● State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission
(SASAC)
● People’s Bank of China (PBOC, sometimes PBoC)
● State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE)
● China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC)
● China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC)
● China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC)
● Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM)
● State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC)
○Administration for Industry and Commerce (AIC) at
provincial and local levels
● State Administration of Taxation (SAT)
● National Social Security Fund (NSSF)

COMPANIES
● Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC)
● Bank of China (BOC)
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● China Construction Bank (CCB)
● Agricultural Bank of China (ABC)
● China Development Bank (CDB)
● China Investment Corporation (CIC)
● China International Capital Corporation (CICC)
● China International Trust and Investment Company (CITIC)
● China Pacific Insurance Company (CPIC)
● Shenzhen Development Bank (SDB)

OTHERS
● State-Owned Enterprises (SOE)
● State-Owned Banks (SOB)
● Foreign Invested Enterprise (FIE)
● Foreign Invested Partnership (FIP)
● Qualified Foreign Limited Partners (QFLP)
● Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII)
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